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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
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Tillier, also known as ROBERT V. SWANN!.-:~
and MILDRED MOLINARI,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

vs.
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NORTON,
administrator of the Estate of CHARLES
CARSON, al~so known as H. F. SWANN, also
known as R. C. TILLER, also known as
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE
ElVIPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the Estate
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, and E.
LEROY SHIELDS,

- u ~ ·,, ,- ~·ne

Defendants and Respondents,

and
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, wife
of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HAZELRIGG
and CATHEDRAL OF THE MAGDALENE
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF East South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah, also known as ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY,
a corporation sole,
Cross-Defendants.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

433 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

W. D. BEATIE,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT V. TILLER, also known as Robert V.
Tillier, also known as ROBERT V. SWANN, \
and l\IILDRED MOLINARI,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.
LOREN G. NORTON, LOREN G. NORTON,
administrator of the Estate of CHARLES
CARSON, also known as H. F. SWANN, also
known as R. C. TILLER, also known as
ROBERT C. TILLER, deceased, and THE
EMPLOYERS LIABILITY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, LTD., a corporation, and
E. LeROY SHIELDS, as executor of the Estate
No. 7770
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased, and E.
LEROY SHIELDS,
Defendants and Respondents,
and
LOREN G. NORTON, GLORIA NORTON, wife
of Loren G. Norton, EDITH M. HAZELRIGG
and CATHEDRAL OF THE MAGDALENE
CATHOLIC CHURCH OF East South Temple,
Salt Lake City, Utah, also known as ROMAN
CATHOLIC BISHOP OF SALT LAKE CITY,
a corporation sole,
Cross-Defendants.
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

THE FACTS
This is an appeal by the plaintiffs, Robert V. Tiller,
also known as Robert V. Tillier, also known as Robert V.
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Swann and Mildred Molinari, from a Decree in favor of
the defendants and against the plaintiffs, no cause of
action.
This action was commenced by the plaintiffs filing an
action against Loren G. Norton, Loren G. Norton, adIninistrator of the Estate of Charles Carson, also known
as H. F. Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as
Robert C. Tiller, deceased, and The Employers Liability
Assurance Corporation, Ltd., the latter being the bondsman of Loren G. Norton the administrator. (R. 1). Plaintiffs then filed an amended complaint with leave of court
(R. 23) to which complaint answers were filed by the
respective defendants and a cross complaint was then
filed wit~ leave of court by the defendant, The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., against Loren
G. Norton, Gloria Norton, wife of Loren G. Norton, Edith
M. Hazelrigg and Cathedral of the Magdalene Catholic
Church of East South Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah,
also known as Roman Catholic Bishop Salt Lake City,
a corporation so1e. (R. 58). By reason of the: filing of the
cross complaint, plaintiffs then with leave of court filed
a second amended complaint (R. 72), adding as party
defendants E. LeRoy- Shields, as executor of the Estate
of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased and E. Le·Roy
Shields. Answers were then filed by the· defendants to
plaintiffs' second amended complaint (The Employe-rs
Liability Assurance C'Orporation R. 101) (E. LeRoy
Shields, executor R. 115) (Loren G. Norton R. 141) and
trial was had upon the same.
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In this brief "·e shall refer to the parties as

follo\v~:

Robert ''""· Tiller and 1\lildred ~[olinari-plaintiffs
Loren G. Norton-administrator
The En1ployers' Liability . A.ssurance Corporation
E. LeRoy Shields-executor.
The complaint alleges in substance that the plaintiffs are residents of Chicago, Illinois and that defendant,
Loren G. Norton, is a resident of Salt Lake County and
was the duly appointed qualified and acting administrator of the Estate of Charles Carson, etc. and that the defendant, The Employers Liability Assurance Corporation, Ltd., is a corporation of Great Britain, authorized
to do business in the State of Utah, and that E. LeRoiJ
Shields is the duly qualified, and acting executor of the
Estate of Grace Catherine Carson, deceased.
That one Charles Carson died intestate in Salt Lake
City, "Ctah, on the 8th day of October, 1948, a resident
of Salt Lake City, Utah, and is referred to in the complaint at all later times either as H. F. Swann, Henry
F. Swann, R. C. Tiller, also known as Robert C. Tiller.
That the plaintiffs are the children and issue of the
marriage of one Maydie Sherman and R. C. Tiller and
that for many years prior to 1922, the· plaintiffs and
Maydie Sherman Tiller, their mother, and R. C. Tiller,
their father, resided at Vetal, South Dakota where: R. C.
Tiller was known as H. F. S-wann, or Henry F. Swann.
That in May of 1922, Maydie Tiller, the mother of plaintiffs was forced to leave R. C. Tille.r, by reason of cruel
treatment and left the family ranch at Vetal, South Dakota, and sought residence at Chicago, Illinois and that
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shortly thereafter, R. C. Tiller did likewise take residence
at Chicago, Illinois. That Maydie Tiller, the mother of
plaintiffs, divorced R. C. Tiller at Chicago, Illinois, on
the 11th day of July, 1924 and that R. C. Tiller remained
absent from his family, the plaintiffs, from 1924 until
the date of his death and that the plaintiffs between
1924 and July 7, 1950, were never informed of the location of their father or his address, but that he had gone
under an assumed name of Charles Carson and so did
business in Salt Lake City, Utah, until the date of his
death on October 8, 1948; that Charles Carson was buried
in Salt Lake City, Utah, on the 12th day of October, 1948,
and left an estate appraised at $28,620.99. That on the
11th day of October, 1948, one Dr. Howard T. Anderson,
a preferred creditor of Charles Carson, deceased, did
file a joint petition for letters of special administration
and administration and designated that one Grace
Catherine Sweney Carson was the widow of the decedent,
(Ex. L-1) and that the Hon. Roald A. Hogenson did on
the 11th day of October, grant letters of special administration to Tracy Collins Trust Company; that on the
13th day of October, Grace Catherine Carson filed a
petition for probate of said estate (Ex. S-1) alleging
that Charles Carson left surviving the following heirs
at law: "Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein
and no other presently known heirs at law."
On October 14, 1948, Tracy Collins Trust Company,
special administrator, filed a petition allegeing that
Charles Carson was also known as H. F·. Swann, also
known as Henry F. Swann, and that the title should be
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so runended and tha.t decedent had two ehild.ren by Inarriage, nalnely Robert v. S\\Ta.nn and l\f rs. l\lildred s,vann
~Iolanari, "Tho 'Yere last heard of at l ~hicago, Illinois in
the year 1944. Notice of hearing' on letters of administration 'Yere then 1nailed on the petition of Dr. Anderson
to Grace Catherine Sweney Carson at 2300 South State
Street, Salt Lake County, Utah, Robert V. Swann, Chicago, illinois and ~Irs. l\Iildred S·wann Molanari, Chicago,
illinois on the 16th day of October, 1948. (Ex. L-1). On
the :21st day of October, 1948, Grace Carson filed an
objection to the petition of Dr. Anderson for letters and
alleged ~~That decedent had relatives in the State of Arizona the exact denomination is not familiar to the Protestant but that said Protestant is now making inquiry to
determine 'vho such relatives and heirs are." (Ex. L-1).
On December 21, 1948, Dr. Anderson filed an amended
petition for letters of administration, setting forth that
his information, since the filing of his original petition,
is that Grace Catherine Sweney Carson was not the
widow of the decedent and that the heirs a.t law were
Robert V. Swann and Mrs. Mildre·d Swann Molana.ri, of
Chicago, Illinois. On the 6th day of May, 1949, Tracy
Collins filed a petition further amending the title of
the deceased by adding R. C. Tiller and Robert C. Tiller.
On June 7, 1949, Grace Carson filed an amended petition
for probate, alle:ging, "that he left him surviving the following heirs at law, Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein and no other p·resently known heirs at law."
On the 1st day of April, 1949, Neil O'Donnell, filed a
petition as a p·referred creditor, asking the appointment
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of Tracy Collins Trust Company and alle·ged that Robert
V. Swann and Mildred Swann Molanari were the heirs
at law. (Ex. 19). By order of court the petitions filed
by Dr. Anderson, Grace Carson and Neil O'Donnell were.
consolidated for hearing and various hearings were had
thereon at which the testimony of Mr. Beless, the assistant trust officer of the special administrator was adduced
as to what progress was made by letters and inquiries as
to the whereabouts of the plaintiffs and the total sum
of $25.00 was authorized for search of the plaintiffs, by
the court. At one of these hearings Grace CatheTine Carson testified as to he·r marriage in South Dakota, 25 or
30 years before to the decedent and that they had lived
as husband and wife to the de-ath of the decedent.
That on the 11th day of June, 1949, the Hon. Jos. G.
Jeppson did make an oral decision appointing Loren G.
Norton, the designee of Grace Carson, the administrator
of the Charles Carson Estate. That a printed form Order
appointing Loren G. Norton as administrator was signed
by the Hon. J os. G. Jeppson on the 20th day of June,
1949, and on the same day, letters of administration were
filed by Loren G. Norton and a corporate surety bond in
the sum of $22,000.00 was filed by the defendant, The
ErnployeTs Liability Assurance Corporation.
Tracy Collins in accordance with the~ Order of Judge
Jeppson filed its first and final account as special administrator on July 7, 1949, requesting instructions of
the court as to whether or not the assets of the estate
should be turned over to Loren G. Norton until such tin1e
as Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree
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'vere entered on the n1atter of the appoint1nent of the administrator in the eause. That on the 2~nd day of July,
1949, Judge Joseph G. Jeppson did file Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of La'"" and Decree, appointing Loren
G. Norton as administrator of the Estate of Charles
Carson and did make the following findings:

'"2. That said petitioner and said decedent
owned a store in Salt Lake City, Utah, the name
of 'vhich was Carson and Carson; that both
worked in the store, both transacted the business
and the business was conducted as a partnership·,
and was so run for a period of thirteen years; that
many people in Salt Lake City, Utah, kne.w the
said Mr. and Mrs. Charles Carson for a period of
over thirty years, and who knew them as man and
wife, and that they lived together as man and
wife; that all business that has been conducted
between said parties, Charles Carson and Grace
Catherine Carson, was conducted by both of said
parties and in the business affairs of the~ pHrties,
each was recognized as an owner therein and that
they consulted together in relation to said business matters, and that during all of said time, they
lived together, cohabited together as man and
wife, and that the said Charles Carson, also
known as H. F. Swann, also known as Henry F'.
Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as
Robert C. Tiller, always obtained pe!rmission from
Grace Catharine Carson in all business deals that
were transacted within the knowledge of them,
and the witnesses who knew them and all others,
acccording to their understanding and best information."
"4. That Mrs. Grace Catharine Carson, in a
hearing before the above entitled Court, testified
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under oath that she and Mr. Charles Carson, also
known as H. F. Swann, also known as Henry F.
Swann, also known as R. C. Tiller, also known as
Robert C. Tiller had traveled and lived together
as man and wife in other states, including the
State of Wyoming, in which they lived for a
period of over six months, and in the State of
Utah, for a period of twenty-five to thirty years."
"7. That he left surviving the following
heirs at law, Grace Catherine Carson, your petitioner herein."
Prior to filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law and Decre:e, appointing Loren G. Norton as of July
22, 1949, administrator, an Order of Publication of Notice to Creditors was filed on the 23rd day of June, 1949,
by Loren G. Norton as administrator and publication
of notice to creditors was completed on the 15th day of
July, 1949. Publication to creditors being in the name of
Charles Carson, also known as H. F. Swann, also known
as Henry F. Swann, also known as Henry F. Tiller, also
known as R. C. Tillier, also known as Robert Tiller, deceased.
I

Tracy Collins Trust Company the·reupoo turned
over the assets of the estate to Loren G. Norton for administration and Tracy Collins Trust Comp·any was discharged as special administrator on the 31st day of
August 1949.
That E. LeRoy Shields, a notary public had Dr. Howard T. Anderson file a claim for $25.00 on September
8, 1949, and said claim was approved and allowed by

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

9

Court September 9, 1949. Pay1nent of said claim is alleged in the first and final account of Chas. Carson estate.
That Loren G. Norton, as administrator filed a petition for widow's allowance for Grace Carson for the
smn of $125.00 per ·month on June 29, 1949, and did. obtain an Order granting widow's allowance on July 1,
1949, \Yithout any notice of said hearing, and did again
on October 28, 1949, file a petition for increase of widow's
allowance to Grace Carson to the sum of $200.00 per
month, which order was granted without notice on the
28th day,of October, 1949. On December 7, 1949, Loren
G. Norton filed a first and final account and petition
for distribution in said estate alleging:
Hthat the only heir of said decedent that can be
found is Grace Catherine Carson who died on the
4th day of N o;vember, 1949, leaving a will to her
property and estate which has been filed for probate in the above entitled court."
That on this first and final p·etition the only notice
given was that of posting notices and the court did enter
a decree of settlement of first and final account and for
distribution and discharge as of the 21st day of December, 1949, which decree provided:
"That the said. Charles Carson, also known
as H. F. Swan, also known as Henry F. Swan, also
known as R. C. Tiller, also known as Robert C.
Tiller, deceased, died intestate leaving him surviving the following heirs at law who would be
entitle·d to share in the residue of said estate as
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hereinafter described, remaining for distribution;
Grace Catherine Carson, his wife, of ·Salt Lake
City, Utah."
That to date there has never been filed receipts in
the estate of Charles Carson, deceased, nor a discharge
of the adminis.trator as such.
The plaintiffs allege eleven acts as the basis of this
action, being broken ·up into three periods as follows:
That the defendant, Loren G. Norton, did falsely,
fraudulently and deceitfully enter into and act with
Grace Catherine Carson in her application and actions
applying for his appointment in said estate as the administrator thereof in the following particulars :
(a) That at the time Grace Catharine Carson filed her petition for letters of administration
and objection to the petition of Dr. Howard T.
Anderson, that defendant Loren G. Norton well
knew that plaintiffs herein were the children of
the decedent Charles Carson and to his best information resided in Chicago, Illinois.
(h) That Grace Catharine Carson was not
the widow of Charles Carson, deceased, nor was
she his heir at law.
(c) The. publishing of a purported notice to
creditors, the first publication of which was on
June 24, 1949, and the last date of publication
. on the 15th day of July, 1949, prior to his appointment as the duly appointed and qualified administrator of the estate of Charles Carson deceased.
That Loren G. Norton, as administrator of the Estate of Charles Carson, deceased, falsely, fraudulently
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and deceitfully acted "~ith Grace Catherine Carson from
the time of his appointment until the death of the said
Grace Catharine Carson in the handling of said estate
in the following particulars :

~

(d) That no legal notice to heirs or creditors
was ever published in this estate.
(e) That he did file two petitions herein
referred to in paragraph 11, for widow's allowance and had the sum of $500.00 paid out of the
estate, well knowing that Grace Catharine Carson
was not the widow of the decedent or entitled to
a widow's allowance.
(f) That at no time after July 22, 1949, were
notices sent to the plaintiffs herein advising them
of any matter in the handling or distribution of
the Estate of Charles Carson, deceased.
(g) That no diligent search was made to locate the plaintiffs herein at Chicago, Illinois, and
that plaintiffs have for many years resided at
Chicago, illinois, and could easily have been located through proper channels of investigation.
(h) That he failed to inventory assets,
which he owed to the estate, and thereby converted the same to his own use in the sum of
$300.00. That he failed to inventory an indebtedness of his brother, which was a loan on the
part of the decedent to his brother, and that he
failed to prope:rly inventory assets of said es.tate
which were in his possession, namely numerous
rings and settings of rings and instances of safety
deposit box and blue foot locker.

That Loren G. Norton, administrator, falsely, fraudulently and deceitfully failed to disclose to the Corurt in
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the First and F'inal Account and Petition for Distribution of said estate the fo1lowing:
(i) The fact that he knew prior to the death
of the decedent that the plaintiffs were the children of the decedent and his lawful heirs.
(j) That Grace Catharine Carson was not
the widow of the decedent and entitled to distribution of all assets of said estate as the only heir
at law.
(k) The fact of what search had been made
as the administrator of the estate to locate the
plaintiffs herein nor to disclose to the Court the
likelihood of plaintiffs herein being heirs at law
of said decedent well knowing, that he, the said
defendant, would beneficially gain by not making
any such disclosures of other heirs, as he at said
time well knew, at the time of the filing of said
First and Final· Account that Grace Catharine
Carson had died on November 4, 1949, prior to the
filing of the First Account and that he, the defendant, was the residuary beneficiary of the estate of Grace Catharine· Carson and would materially gain by not having the plaintiffs herein participate in the distribution of the: estate of Charles
Carson deceased, and that failure to dis·close to
the Court the probability of such heirs for the
purpose of depriving these plaintiffs of their just
share of said estate and by such failure to so disclose the probability of plaintiffs, from having
plaintiffs herein advised as to their interest in the
estate, and to avoid any adversary contest in the
p~robate of said estate·.
At the trial of this cause it was determined that
the plaintiffs were the children and heirs of Charles
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Carson (R·. 1±6) so there is no issue of that fact on this
appeal.
\Tolmne one of the transcript could have; be-en eliminated as the first four w·itnesses, namely plaintiffs
and the two ~Ir. Bakers from South Dakota testified
as to identity of plaintiffs. Counsel for The Employers
Liability insisted on the full record on app·eal.
The following statement of 'vitnesses will eliminate
as much as possible of the fact that plaintiffs are heirs
of Charles Carson, deceased.
Robert V. Tiller, one of the plaintiffs, relates the
names used during his life, states the name of his father
and mother and that he was born October 4, 1901. (R. 173
and 409). That he resided at 4707 Kenmore Avenue,
Chicago, illinois, six years immediately prior to coming
to Salt Lake City in 1950 (R. 174), and then relates the
other various addresses where he resided in Chicago,
since approximately 1930. (R. 182). His earliest recollection of any residence was Gynadotte, West Virginia,
when about two years old. (R. 184). That his father's
name was Robe·rt C. Tiller and mother's Maydie Sherman
Tiller, and moved to Chicago and attended Longfellow
Schoo~ until1912 or 1913. (R. 185). Then moved to Vetal,
South Dakota residing there until 1926, and attended
England School. (R. 187). That his mother died in Chicago in 1926. (R. 189). He left the farm at Vetal, South
Dakota in 1927, traveling to Omaha, Nebraska, Denver,
Colorado, working on farms and for Union News Company at Denver. (R. 190). Returned to Chicago in 1930
and resided there until 1950 except for trip~s. (R. 191).
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Operated restaurant nine months 1n 1949 in Chicago.
(R. 195).
That his father's name while residing in Chicago
was H. F. Swann and mother's name Mary Swann. Plaintiff's name, Robert Swann and sister's name Mildred
Swann and the same names were used during the family
residence at V etal, South Dakota. (R. 203). He last saw
his father in 1923, when he left the farm at Vetal, South
Dakota, but communicated by letter for a year. (R. 204).
Made trip to California in 1948 by Trailway Bus. Made
inquiry of father at Vetal in 1947 or 1948 by letter. (R.
216). Had never received any mail from Salt Lake City,
Utah, of any kind, and the name he used since 1930 was
Robert Tillier. (R. 219). Had been working three or four
years for Yellorw Cab in Chicago, prior to going to California in 1946. (R. 269).
On cross examination, plaintiff relates various employments (R. 345 to 375), and that he had a telephone
listing in 1949 at Chicago. (R. 397 to 401). He used the
name Tillier. (R. 401).
The other plaintiff, Mildred Molinari, resides at 1354
W ashtenaw, Chicago, Illinois. Recalled living in Huntington, West Virginia and that father's name was R. C.
Tiller, and mother's name Maydie Tiller. (R. 427). That
her brother, Robert Tiller, and the family moved to 3302
Archer Street, Chicago. (R. 428). The family then mo:ved
as a group to V etal, South Dakota and the father's name
was then Henry F. Swann, mothe~r's name wa.s Maydie
Swann, brother's name Robert s.wann and attended
England School, graduating in 1913. (R.. 430). The
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fan1ily resided as a group at \retal, South Dakota until
1922, "~hen mother and thh~ plaintiff went to Huntington, ' 1'"est -y·irginia to see her grandin other for two
months and then returned to Chicago. (R. 431). This
plaintiff remained in Chicago, and Inother returned to
\1'" etal, South Dakota, during which time this plaintiff
was e1nployed about three weeks at Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
and 'vas then married and there was one child, issue of
the marriage, Anthony l\folinari and that she. was later
divorced and married Pellegreni and divorced hiin. (R.
432).
This plaintiff was present at divorce proceedings
in Chicago by which her mother obtained a divorce from
her father who was then residing in Chicago. (R. 433).
Exhibits B-1 to E-1, admitted, showing personal service
of summons on defendant R. C. Tiller at Chicago, Illinois,
complaint filed, the testimony at the hearing of the divorce decree and decree of divorce of Maydie Tiller from
R. C. Tiller, July 7, 1924. (R. 434). This plaintiff was a
registered voter in Chicago under the name of Pellegreni
(R. 437). Phone in name of Mildred Molinari in Chicago
for 10 years. (R. 438). In December 1926, at time of
·death of her mother, this plaintiff saw her father at her
home in Chicago and saw and talked with her fa.the:r in
Chicago in 1927. She further identifie:d father in Exhibits U and V. (R. 444). Relates various re'Sidences from
earlie·st remembrance to date. (R. 445).
This plaintiff was cross examined as to residences
and marriages and divorces and various aliases used to
date of trial, at various cities in this country. She related
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that she had an unlisted phone at the Washtenaw address in Chicago, always in the name of Molinari or
Pellegreni. (R. 490). She is operating a cleaning business at the present time in Chicago. (R. 492). She has
been a registered voter since 1937 in Chicago under the
name of Mildred.Pellegreni. (R. 499).
George E. Baker a witness for the plaintiffs, who
resides at Martin, South Dakota, and was the owner of
ground in V etal, South Dakota, since 1913, and left there
in September, 1929, (R. 279), stated that he knew a person by the name of H. F. Swann who owned adjacent
ground to him. That Swann came to Vetal, South Dakota
in the fall of 1912 or in the spring of 1913. That Henry F.
Swann, also known as H. F. Swann, visited him at his
home almost every Sunday until such time as his family
came to South Dakota. That the family of Henry F.
Swann was Maydie, his wife, son Robert and daughter
Mildred. He related that Swann tried at one time to ride
a bull in ·a corral and he was thrown from the bull. (R.
286). Identified (Ex. T.) as being Henry Swann and
his wife and the women's name is Maydie, and the same
people he knew as neighbors at Vetal, South Dakota.
After Mr. Swann left the family homestead at Vetal,
South Dakota, he next heard from him in January, 1944;
identified letter, (Ex. Y) as having been received by him
from the post office at Martin, (R. 288) ; identified letter
(Ex. Z) as having been received by him in April of 1947.
Had conversation at his home, Martin, South Dakota,
about a couple of months after Exhibit Z was received
with H. F. Swann, who told the witness that he had been
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to Chicago trying to locate Robert and ~lildred. (R. 290).
He stated he had no success and failed to find then1 and
a~ked Ine if I kne"· any one he could rontact 'vho 1night
perhaps kno"· anything or 'vhere he could find them. The
main conversation had 'v-as about locating Mildred and
Robert Swann. (R. 294). He stated he had be.en quite
prosperous since he had been in S.alt Lake and said he
had accwnulated quite a little wealth and he. had never
done anything for the children and they were all he had
and he wanted to find them if at all possible and do what
he could for them now.
He stated that when Charles Carson was at Vetal,
South Dakota in 1947, he told him the purpose of his visit
'\\~as to look for his children and after receiving the. card
that he was unable to find them in Chicago, he never
heard further from him. The last he ever heard was a
letter from Salt Lake stating that he was dead. (R. 313).
The letters which he received either in 1949 or 1950 were
to the effect that Henry Swann had died and they were
trying to locate heirs. (R·. 314). On cross examination Mr. Baker was shown Exhibit Y, one of the letters
received from H. F. Swann with ink marks drawn
through H. F. Swann and the words (to be forgotten)
were on the letter when it was received by the witness,
which indicated to the witness that H. F. Swann did not
want his identity made known. (R. 323). This witness
testified that Charles Carson told him that he was going
by the name of Charles Carson. (R. 324). The witness
relates that before 1944 he had heard that Swann was
married under the name of Tiller and that this man had
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come from Chicago and the two children on first acquaintance were known as Robert and Mildred. (R. 329).
George D. Baker, a witness for the plaintiffs testified that he resides at Martin, South Dakota. (R. 334).
That he attended the England School, south of Vetal,
South Dakota in 1913 and that during grade school at
the England School, he knew Mildred Swann and Robert
Swann and identified the plaintiffs as being those people.
(R. 335). The· last he ever saw the p~laintiff, Mr. Swann
was in 1927, (R. 337), but that plaintiff used the name
of Tiller in 1924. (R. 338). That Robert S.wann graduated in 1916, and he had no co~mmunication with Robert
Swann after he left Vetal in 1927. (R. 339). He never
saw Mildred's father after 1922. (R. 340).
L. J. Barclay, a witness in behalf of plaintiff testified that he is a practicing attorney and identified Exhibits U and V as to Charles Carson and the women who
purported to be his wife. (R. 506). The witness represented Charles Carson in excess of ten ye:ars prior to
1948 and on several occasions in discussing the handling
of real property and the interest of the lady that he was
living with as his wife, such that she would have· to sign,
Carson then told him that it was none of her business
or something to that effect and then would go elsewhere,
and each time that Carson came to the witness about real
estate transactions he had explained to him that she
had to sign and then he would go eJsewhere. (R. 507).
During the last three or four years of the life of Mr.
Carson, the witness had conversations with reference to
two children of Mr. Carson. (R. 508). In the latter part
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of 1947 he ca1ne to 'vitness' office talking about a son
and daughter and a grandson by the name of Tony and
that he had been back to Chicago and had gone over all
the street known as DeKalb looking for his daughter and
that his son's name was R. \r. Swann; that his daughter
had married several times, and that he.r first name was
~Iildred Swann and that he thought her name was Sabatora and the last name Moulanita; that the grandson
Tony was studying in a medical schooJ. (R. 509). Arrangements were made for witness to search for the children and correspondence was had with a relative in
West Virginia and the Chief of Police of West Huntington, West -virginia. (R. 510).
On cross examination he testified that the search
made by the witness for the children was in the latter
part of 1947 and possibly into January of 1948.
Edith Hazelrigg, called as a witness for p~laintiffs
testified that she resides in Salt Lake City and that he.r
name, prior to marriage was Edith Ge,rtrude Nicholls.
(R. 520). That the mother of the witness was Mrs. Grace
Catherine Sweney Carson and her father was Archie
Nicholls. (R. 521). Ex. L-1 being file #307 62 of the District Court in the probate of the Estate of Charles Carson, deceased, was admitted in evidence. (R. 524). The
witness lived with her mother until about 1929 and said
that she presumed her mother's name was Mrs. Nicholls.
From 1930 until 1932 the witness lived with her mother
at 227 South 2nd East Street, Salt Lake City, in a boarding house at which time she still presumed her mother's
name was Nicholls. (R. 529). The witness knew of no
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other name her mother was called by up to 1932 other
than Sweney or NichoJls, and that since 1932 she had only
seen her mother once. During 1929, while residing at
the Woodruff Apartments with her mother, they had no
roomers with them there but there was a gentleman that
had eaten with them occassionally, but his name was not
knorwn to the witness. (R. 533).
David Barclay testified that he is a member of the
Utah Bar, (R. 538) and identified Mr. Charles Carson
in Exhibit U, and that he represented Charles Carson
while he operated a store on South West Temple Street.
(R. 539). That Barclay & Barclay had been employed by
Mr. Carson to make a search to locate his son and daughter. Mr. Carson informed the witness that he had been
in Chicago in the fall of 1947 trying to locate his son and
daughter and was very certain they were in Chicago and
was emphatic that the name Swann should be spelled
with two ·n's. (R. 541). During a real estate transaction
handled by the witness for Carson in approximately 1943,
when it was explained to him that title would he in his
name and that he and his wife would enter into the contract and when the contract was paid up· he and she
would have to give a Warranty Deed to the property,
Mr. Carson at tha;t time stated "it is none of her business
it is my money." Carson brought the people to the· office
and the husband of the purchaser insisted that Mrs.
Carson be on the contract as one of the sellers. Mr.
Carson stated it was none of her business and at tha.t
time I said to him, well is she your wife or isn't she and
he colored up and refused to answer. (R. 544).
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On cross examination the witness testified that at
the request of :\Ir. Carson he had \VTitten to the University of Chieago to determine if Tony Molona.ri was a
n1edical student, (R. 548) and likewise to Northwestern
l . . niversity and received information of other medical
schools in and about Chicago and Milwaukee; likewise
the . .L\ssociation of ~Iedical Colleges were written to,
\vhich covers all accredited schools, (R. 549) and inquired
at Rush ~ledical College. ( R. 550). A letter was also
written to the Chicago Public Library asking them to asSwann and Mrs. Mildred Molona.ri,
sist in locating R.
asking them to check the City Directory, but witness was
not clear whether an answer was received or not. (R.
551).
Loren G. Norton, a defendant, called in behalf of
plaintiff testified that he resides in Salt Lake City, is a
real estate salesman for about a year and a half, and
prior to that was in the dry cleaning business and is
a married man and his wife's name is Gloria. (R. 553).
The witness identified Charles CarBon in Exhibit U and
first met Charles Carson and Mrs. Carson around May
of 1947 when he was purchasing Hollywood Cleaners.
(R. 554). About four months after the witness purchased
HoJlywood Cleaners from Neils Hansen, Mr. Carson informed the witness that he held a mortgage on the busi·
ness. (R. 556). In November of 1947, the~ amount of the
Chattel Mortgage was greater than the payments agreed
to be paid by the witness to Pete Hansen, the selleT of the
Hollywood Cleaners and at that time a conditional sales
contract between Charles Carson and the witness was

'T·
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made. (R. 557). The. witness identified Exhibit M-1, the
conditional sales contract between himself and Charles
Carson. (R. 558). The witness then identified Ex. N-1
which is a chattel mortgage and promissory note of the
witness to Mr. Carson and testified that by March of
1948 the conditional sales contract was paid down to
$700.00, at which time he needed some. money and asked
Mr. Carson for a loan of an additional $1300.00 and he
gave it to the witness and he paid $700.00 to clear the note
and a note was then issu~d for $2,000.00 to Mr. Carson.
Ex. 0-1 was identified, showing the balance of the conditional sales contract item at $700.00 paid in full and the
$1300.00 check of Mr. Carson to the~ witness. (R. 560).
Witness testified that he had no other checks other than
Ex. P-1 which were paid to Mr. c·arson prior to his death.
(R. 561). The witness testified that his relations with
Charles Carson were chiefly business relations, but that
Mr. Carson did not at any time during his lifetime seek
advice from the witness in any business way. (R. 562).
Witness then described the physical appearance of
Charles Carson on or about October 1st, as being about
75 years of age, and physically active. (R. 564). Between March 20th and the 1st part of July, 1948, the
witness was in California and had no dealings with
Mr. Carson other than through his brother with a power
of attorney and had no visits with Mr. and Mrs. Carson.
Between July 1, 1948, to Octobe-r 8, 1948, the, witness
saw Mr. Carson about every day he was at Hollywood
Cleaners. (R. 565). Witness testified that about ten days
before October 8, 1948, Mr. Carson was taken to the
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County Hospital and that he visited hin1 there and
that he had a stroke and "·as capable of 1noving his arms
or legs once in a \Yhile. The witness denied that during
the ten day period while Charles Carson was at Jean's
Rest Home, 2300 South State Street, where he died, that
he at any time attempted to have Mr. Carson sign a
general power of attorney. (R. 569). While Mr. Carson
\Yas at J ea.n's Rest Home, he was refused once the right
to see :\1r. Carson and after the refusal he made. a further visit to ~Ir. Carson. (R. 570). On these: later occasions the witness' attorney Mr. Jed Shields accompanied
him. (R. 571). The witness denied removing any of the
Charles Carson's personal property from Jean's Rest
Hon1e and further stated that he moved Mrs. Carson out
of her hotel and took everything out to Jean's Rest Home.
(R. 572). Witness was notified of the de:ath ·of Charles ·
Carson p·robably five minutes after it happ·ened by the
Rest Home. That information supplied to Neil O'Donnell, the undertaker for Charles Carson was given by
Mrs. Carson to the witness and then communicated to
Neil O'Donnell. (R. 573). On October 9th, the witness
took Mrs. Carson from Jean's Rest Home and from then
on made provisions for her residence. (R. 574). That
~1rs. Carson was moved to two or three different places
and then was hospitalized by Dr. Pace.
Witness was asked the question:
"Q. Did you ever have a conversation with
Charles Carson in the latter part of 1947 as
to whether or not he had been inquiring in
the east for his children~ (R. 575).
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A. Yes.
Q. What did he say : relate when and where and
what was said Mr. Norton.
A. It was in the Hollywood Cleaners. All I remember about it is that he said he had been
back looking for his children.
Q. That is all that was said~
A. Yes.
Q. Didn't you in your deposition, taken on November 4, 1950, page 32, beginning at line 13,
weren't you asked the question by Mr. LeRoy
Shields: At the time before his death did he
ever state to you that he had any children
at that time or whether he had any or not
after he came back from the east. (R. 576).
Your anwser was he didn't find anybody, didn't you so answer to that question~
A. Yes.
Q. Did he tell you he had been hunting for them,
but he couldn't find them~
A. That is right." (R. 577).
The witness was advised of request for his appointment as administrator of the Charles Carson Estate on
October 13, 1948. (R. 580). The witness was asked the
foll'OiWing questions and· gave the following answers:
"Q.

At any of the hearings in the Charles Carson
Estate which took place in Judge Je:ppson's
Court did you ever hear or were you advised
by counsel that I, at that time was representing Dr. Anderson and re·presented that there
were two children that were heirs to the· estate~

A.

Yes." (R. 581).
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'Vitness further "Tas asked the following questions
and made the follo"ring answers:
"Q.

A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.

A.
Q.

Were you present in Court at the time· Judge
Jeppson announced his decision that you were
to be administrator of the Charles Carson
Estate.
I believe I was.
At that tin1e you represented you were likewise a debtor of the estate did you. not~
I did.
And stated you were a debtor in the sum of
how much money~
$1100.00.
The $$1100.00 balance which you claim was
due to Mr. Carson was the net balance which
was due at that time on the note, that is June
of 1949~
Yes.
In the interim between October 8, 1948, and
the date of the announcement of Judge; J epson had you made any payments on the account of the Chattel Mortgage to Charles
Carson~

A. Yes, I gave Mrs. Carson two payments.
Q. I hand you what had been marked Exhibit
0-1, and ask you what they are:~
A. The two rece~ipts.
Q. Of the amount which you represented to
Judge Jeppson $1100.00 you had used the two
receipts totaling $300.00 and you had deducted that amount to arrive at $1100.00 didn't
you~

A. I believe so. (R. 582).
Q. Do you at this time claim that the p~ayment
by those two receipts to Mrs. Carson on the
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A.

Q.
A.
Q.

Chattel·Mortgage of Charles Carson was paid
to Charles Carson or his estate-~
Yes. I believe on one of those receipts it
says-let me take a look, it says 'I received
from Loren G. Norton, doing business as
Hollywood Cleaners, $150.00 for October payment to Mr. Charles Carson, signed by Grace
Carson," that was to him.
What was the date of that~
October 15, 1948.
What was the date of the other rece~ipt for
$150.00~

A. November 15, 1948.
Q. That was after the de-ath of Charles Carson~
A. Both of them was. (R. 583).
Q. Mr. Norton, what if anything did you do with
relation to discovering if there we-re any other
heirs, other than Grace Carson, who purported to be a widow in the estate of Charles
Carson~ (R. 585).
A. As I stated before, I was at most of the hearings and hHard what went on in court, and, as
I understand it, Mr. Beless had looked for,
and T·racy Collins Trust Company had looked
for the~m without any success, and when Mr.
Carson-before I was appointed administrator I still tried to get in touch with friends
of his and see if they knew anything of the
children and they was the only people we
kne~w at the time and they was some people
Mrs. Carson told me about and I made a
personal phone call to Toledo, Ohio and notified them he had died and asked if the1y knew
anything of the children.
Q. Is this phone· call the only endeavor you made
outside of the State of Utah to find any other
heirs~
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.A..

It is.
Q. ''!as it before or after your appoint1nent as
a.dn1inistrator that yon called T-Iarry Costello
in Toledo, Ohio!
A. Before, I believe, well I wasn't appointed until June, 1949 \Yas I as administrator~
Q. Your oral order was June. 20th.
A. It \Yas long time before that I got hold of
Harry Costello. (R. 587).
The Court. Do I understand during this period of your administration of the estate you didn't make any further inquiry!
A. No Sir, the Judge-(R. 588).
Q. Did you ever hear Mrs. Carson say whether
or not she knew Mr. Carson had children~
A. No. I don't believe I did. (R. 589).
Q. Did Mrs. Carson ever state to you after Mr.
Carson's death on October 8th, whethe·r she
knew l\fr. Carson had children by a previous
marriage or not~
A. I don't recall.
Q. You read in some of those petitions that there
were no heirs known other than Mrs. Carson~
A. Yes. (R. 590).
Q. When did you take posse,ssion of the p·ersonal
effects of Mr. Carson~
A. When did I take possession~
Q. Yes.
A. After Mr. Carson was in the rest home, I
moved his wife and all his belongings, I believe everything went to J e·an's Rest Home.
Q. Do you recall what with reference to the number of bags, trunks or things that was mo;ved
particularly then~ (R. 594).
A. As I remember it there was one trunk, a small
suit case, some blanke~ts and some bags of
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Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.

clothing, I don't recall just what all of them
was.
This trunk you recall, is that the blue foot
locker that has been discussed~
Yes, it is.
Afte·r delivery of this blue foot locker to
Jean's Rest Home, did you take it into your
possession between then and shortly after
the ·death of Mr. Carson~
Mrs. Carson did. Mrs. Carson asked me to
take the blue: foot locker to my home'. (R. 59-6).
Demand was made upon yoru by Tracy CoJlins Trust Company for delivery of all the
personal property of Mr. Carson to the bank
was it not~
No, there was demand for the foot locker
I believe and Mr. Beless came to the house
and picked it up. (R. 597).
You never discussed, prior to your appointment what was in the blue foot locker~
No. She said it was important papers in it
and that was all. That is why she sent me to
pick up the box and take it to my house~
She told you the·re were important papers in

"t'.

l

A. That is right.
Q. Mr. Norton, I believe it is correct is it not that
Grace Carson died on November 4, 1949~
A. That is right..
Q. When did you find out, first, that you were
the residuary legatee of her e~state~
A. It was two or three days after she was in or
shortly after she died.
Q. By whom we:re you advised~
A. By Mr. Shields. (R. 605).
Q. Did you, at any time after your appointment
discuss with your counsel the advisability of
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A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.
Q.

for\\'"arding any notices of any type: to the
plaintiffs advising then1 of the probate of the
Estate of Charles Carson, deceased?
I believe, there was notices sent out by the
court "'"hile I was ad1ninistrator, that is all I
kno".,.·
To these plaintiffs~
That is right.
Have you seen such a notice~
I have not. (R. 609).
Mr. Norton, shortly afte·r Charles C·arson died
you stated on cross-examination that you
made a phone call to Harry Costello, is that
correct~

Yes.
Q. For what purpose Mr. N ort.on ~
A. Notifying him of the death and to see if he
knew anything of the children.
Q. What did Mr. Costello tell you concerning

A.

that~

That he didn't know anything about them. (R.
613).
On redirect examination Mr. Norton, you
were asked the following question's and gave the
following answers:
Q. What endeavor did you make while you we:re
administrator of the estate to locate them.
The answer was 'and at the time of Mr. Carson's death I called a friend of his in Toledo,
Ohio. Q. What was the~ name: of that p·erson ~
A. I don't remember. Costello I believe. I
told him of the death and asked him if he
knew of any children.
Q. What was his reply to you.
A. He didn't.
Q. Was that H. C. Costello of 220 Maumee Avenue, Toledo, Ohio 9 ~
A.
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A. I believe so.
Q. Did he inform you that he didn't knorw of any
children~

A.

He told me there was children. He didn't
know anything of them. He said Mr. Carson
hadn't heard from the.m for a good many
years.' Did you so answer to those questions~
A. I did and I didn't deny just now that he said
there· was children he said he didn't know
anything of them." (R. 620).

Exhibit T-1 which is the deposition of Gustave Kopp
was received. (R. 606).
Neil O'Donnell, the undertaker called in behalf of
plaintiffs testified as follows:
"The Court. Mr. O'Donnell, there was one
notation, he was married 24 years ago.
A. Your honor, I cannot remember that definitely,! don't know whether it came from Mr.
Norton or Mrs. Carson, I am sure it was
either party, but I am not sure which one. (R.
637).
Q. Who gave you that information~
A. Either Mrs. Carson or Mr. Norton and he was
advised by his. widow, that could he a fact
of Iny oiWil notations from Chicago. That was
either Mr. Norton or Mrs. Carson and that
he was married 24 years ago was either Mrs.
Carson or Mr. Norton." (R. 638).
Jean Sinclair, called as a witness for the plaintiffs
testified that she resides at 2300 South State Street and
operates Jean's Rest Home where Charles Carson was
admitted September 27, 1948 and that Grace Catherine
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Carson 'Yas a.d1nitted on October 2, lD-t-8 as a patient.
The 'vitness identified l\[ r. Loren G. Norton in the court
room as being the person '"ho made visits to 1\tir. Carson
and the following testin1ony ""as adduced.
~·Q.

A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Do you recall any particular visitations to
J.\fr. Carson by l\fr. Norton or attempts to
visit Mr. Carson~
He crune down with another man for Mr.
Carson to sign a power of attorney.
You say a power of attorney, did you see this
purported power of attorney~
I saw the paper.
Did you read the same?
Yes sir.
What conversation did you have with Mr.
Norton or the man who accompranied him vvith
reference to the same~
I told Mr. Norton, in my opinion the patient
was not competent to sign a p·ower of attorne;y
and without his doctor's permission that it
couldn't be done in my home. (R. 647).
Was the:re any particular situation in
which the personal effects of Mr. Carson were
brought to your rest home1 Will you relate
to the Court the circumstances in which they
were received and what disposition was made
of them1
Mrs. Carson-Mrs. Grace Carson, was sent
to the home through the ausp~ices of the County Hospital, the same as Mr. Carson and when
she came she brought a foot locker and a
couple of paper suit cases-paper bag suit
case with her and a box of cooking utensilsthat would probably be a double boile:r or
something like that and she brought them
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Q.
A.

Q.
A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.
Q.

A.

Q.
A.

with her and Mr. Norton was the man that
brought them.
What was done with the p·ersonal belongings
-what disposition did you make of them~
They were placed in a double garage in the
rear.
Were they subsequently ever disposed of?
Do you know what disposition was made of
those particular i terns~ (R. 648).
Within 24 hours the foot locker disappeared.
. It was locked-! didn't have. a key and didn't
know the contents.
At or about this particular time of the bringing of the foot locker to your rest home did
you have conversation with Mrs. Carson with
reference to the same~
Yes, Mrs. Carson wanted the foot locker with
her and said there were important papers in
it, such as contracts and different papers that
Mr. Carson had.
You remember that within 24 hours the blue
foot locker disappeared~ Did you report that
fact to Mrs. Carson~
Yes I did.
Did you ever have any conve:rsation with Mrs.
Carson while she was a patient at your home
with relation to any trip, that she and Mr.
Carson had made to Chicago~
Yes, she said first, prior to his stroke, that he
ha;d been in Chicago to see! if he could locate
two children. He had a boy and a girl, and
that was only one of several he had made
to locate the family. (R. 649).
Did you ever have any conversation with
Mrs. Carson with relation to any indebtedness that was owed to Mr. Carson?
Yes.
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Q. \\.,.ill you kindly relate ".here the conversation
took place and " . ho was there and what was
said please~
A. ~Irs. Carson had come down stairs to fix~frs. Carson came out in the kitchen and
asked for a cup of eoffe·e. We gave it to her.
She "'"as sitting there and she said the reason
she didn't want Mr. Norton to have this boxit 'vas very important that he didn't have this
foot locker affair, was because that in it were
papers showing he owed Mr. Carson $4,000.00
and also other people, that owed money on
accounts." (R. 650).
~Irs.

Ellen Ra,vlins, as witness for the plaintiffs,
testified that she is part owner of Jean's Rest Home
and that Charles Carson was a patient at the home.
Relative to a power of attorney she testified:

"Q. Will you kindly relate the conversation heard,
relate what was said by one party and the
other~

A.

They asked to have the Power of Attorney
signed.
The Court: Who~
Q. When you say they that didn't indicate who
made the statement.
A. Mr. Shields, and Jean said she wouldn't allow
it as long as the patient wasn't rational
enough to know what he was doing. They
wanted to take his hand and make a cross.
They would have had to lift his hand because
he couldn't use his hands."

James W. Beless, Jr., testified that he was assistant
trust officer of Tracy Collins Trust Company and that
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he represented the special administrator and appeared
numerous times in Judge Je·ppson's court on the question of appointment of general administrator of the
Estate of Charles Carson and related what letters and
inquiries had been made to determine the whereabouts
of the plaintiffs. He related that he inquired of a private
investigator in Chicago as to his fee to carry on the investigation and it would be $30.00 to $40.00 per day,
which matte~r was represented to the Court. The. Court
had authorized the special administrator to expend
up to $25.00 in making a search for p~laintiffs and stated
that he had serious doubts whether a special administrator had any power to make such a search without a Court
order. Evidence of the true names of the· plaintiffs
were obtained from papers within the blue foot locker
and that subsequently the assets were turned OiVe!r to
Loren G. Norton under order of court on July 22, 1949.
On cross-examination he stated that the investigation to locate heirs was started around the first of 1949.
(R. 678).
Agnes C. Tee·ter called as a witness for the plaintiffs
testified she resided at Salt Lake City, Utah and knew
Charles Carson since about 1941. The following questions and answers were given :

"Q. We will take· just the~ conversations you had
at the place of business. Will you relate who
was present and what was said on those occasions!
A. Just the· three of us.
Q. With regard to conversations about children
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(R. 686). Just tell "~hat Andy said, what
Grace said and 'vhat you said if you can recall.
A. He said he had a son and daughter and he
hadn:tt heard fron1 the1n for years and they
"~ere either in Chicago or in South Dakota,;
that they had for1nerly lived in South Dakota
and that he 'vas going to try and find them,
and that "'"as his wish, because he knew his
health "\vas bad and he had a slight stroke and
he wanted to find these two children. (R.
687).
Q. And will you relate where the conversation
took place and who was present and what was
said.
A.. I went up to see her. I come dorwn on the
street car and then I gene·rally take a taxi
home. I lived west on 6th North and Andy
said 'I will go over to the bus depot with you
to get your cab.' I had been down there
several hours talking to them.
We went over and sat in the bus dep·ot,
this evening, and he said 'I am going to go
back to Chicago to find my children.' He
said 'would you let Grace live in your home
and take care of her until I come back.'
I S'aid 'well, as she is a sick women you
shouldn't leave her.' He said 'I have to find
my children.' He says 'I have arranged an
insurance policy for her burial.' " (R. 688).
She further testified her conversation with Grace
was "she felt bad, she said she felt so bad. She called
Andy 'Dad.' She felt so bad Andy had to die and die
before he found his children, and that he had his heart
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set on finding his children and that is what she felt bad
about."
William L. Sanders called for plaintiffs testified
he knew Charles Carson for 14 or 15 years. That he had
a business a couple of doors from Carson and were good
friends and played cards several nights a week, as late
as midnight, or as late as 3 :00 in the morning; that there
were two or three different ladies coming to see him
that he was going with, one by the name of Grace. and
one by the name of Minnie, and that he had discussed
with Carson about his children.
The following questions and answers were given:

"Q.

During your relations with Charles Carson
did you ever have any discussion as to
whether or not he had any children~
A. Yes.
Q. Will you kindly relate where the conversations took place, who was present and what
was said either by yourself and Mr. Carson
or any other persons p-resent; just whatever
you recall as being the conversation~
A. He often mentioned his two children; that
he had and his wife; he hadn't see them in
years. He didn't know where they were, but
he often mentioned them to me wishing he
could find them and shortly before he died,
the last couple of years before he died he
made two trips I know of back east with intention of trying to get in touch with them."
(R. 696).

On cross-examination the witness stated that he
had played cards with th.e decedent for fourte,en years
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and 'vas in business side by side 'vith Charles Carson
in 1936 and played cards both at the store on West Te!mple and then later on South Ten1ple and that after Carson moved to South Temple he saw Grace Carson in back
of the store. (R. 698).
~Iinnie Steffen called as a witness for plaintiffs
testified that she knew Charles Carson during his lifetime and identified Exhibits U and V as being exhibits
given to her by Charles Carson. She first became acquainted 'vith Charles Carson while she was working
at a W.P.A. project and after her working hours terminated at 3 :00 in the afternoon she went to his p·lace on
West Temple and worked there for him. That during
all of the time she worked for him he was on West Temple. That nearly every night she worked at the store,
cleaning up and then would cook supper and on many
oeeasions he would take her to a show. (R. 703). That it
was three or four months after she first started to work
for Charles Carson on West Temple before Grace Carson started coming to the store. (R. 704). That during
these occasions, Charles Carson propo1sed to he-r several
times and that she did not want to marry him. F'urther
that at the store on West Temple he had discussed the
fact that he had children.
On cross examinination the witness testified that
after Carson moved his business to west on South T'emple
that she saw him ·at the store on nume·rous occasions and
that Grace Carson was there at all times after he moved,
but that she never had any meals with them, but an occasional glas·s of beer.
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Neils Hansen called as a witness for the plaintiffs
testified that he had purchased p~roperty from Charles
Carson an·d the decedent had visited him in his. home numerous times and had related to the witness and his
wife, at their place· of business on 2nd West that he had
tried to locate his children and was going to make further
trips to Chicago to locate them, stating that he had some
children, a son and a daughter. This witness related that
Grace Carson knew of the children by the following
conversations:

"Q. During your acquaintance with Grace have
you ever had any conversation with Grace in
relation to Andy Carson's. family~
A. Well, we used to mention it a lort of timesshe called Mr. Carson "Dad"-He was very
anxious to locate his children because, he was
getting along in years and he wanted to make
some arrangements to see if they were taken
care, of, because he felt that sometime or other
he hadn't done just right by them, was the
way I gathered it, and he was very anxious
to locate them and see that they were taken
care of with what he· had." (R. 716).
Dougla:s Thomsen, called on behalf of plaintiffs
testified that he had made a complete search of the Third
District Court records from 1890 to the time of testifying
and that there appeared no divorce action between an
Archie Nicholls and Grace Catherine Sweney Nicholls,
or the re:Verse. thereof.
Martha Larson called as witness for the plaintiffs
testified to the attachment of proof of mailing notices on

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

39
October 16, 194S in Exhibit L-1 and proof of notice in
Exhibit 19 on the 16th day of April 1949 in the petition
filed by Neil O'Donnell and then testified to the custon1
as to return or non-return of letters which were sent
to purported heirs in other states; that there is no record
kept of letters returned and that they are merely thrown
in the ·w·aste basket and whether or not envelopes mailed
in the three instances on the petitions of Dr. Anderson
and Neil O'D-onnell 'vere ever returned or not she had
no recollection.
E. LeRoy Shields testified that he was the attorney
for the Charles Carson estate; that he never had any
conversations with Grace Carson with reference as to
whether or not Charles Carson had any children; tha.t
the only thing he knew about the plaintiffs was the proceedings in court ·and the petitions brought in and arguments made thereon with reference to the appointment
of an administrator. That the witness drew the various
objections and petitions incident to the probate of the
Charles Carson Estate, and that the allegations which
were made were the answers which Mrs. Carson had
given to him; that he made no inquiry of any Arizona
heirs but that was on the part of Mrs. Carson.
Subsequently Mr. Shields testified as follows:

"Q. I am interested only in the question of two
children as heirs.
A. She never told me at that time. I don't know
that she ever told me anything about any children. I was acquainted with that fact when
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Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.

you filed the petitions in court that there was
a claim of that.
But you neiVer discussed it with her as finalOnly asked her about it, if she knew anything
about them.
What did you ask her~
I asked her if she knew anything about any
children of Charles Carson. (R. 736).
What did she say~
She said no.
Where was that conversation had~
I couldn't tell you that, whether it was in
my office or somewhere else. After the matter of the children came up I talked to her
and asked her what she knew about them if
anything. She said she knew nothing." (R.
739).

The deposition of Grace Carson was introduced as
Exhibit Y-1. This deposition was taken on the 26th day
of November, 1948 at L. D. s. Hospital. The following
questions and answers were adduced. (Page 3, Ex. Y-1).

"Q. Were you ever married to anyone·· prior to
assuming the name of Carson~
A. Yes.
Q. What was your name at that time~
A. It was Carson.
Q. Where did you first mee~t Mr. Carson'
A. Right here in Salt Lake City.
Q. What year~
A. I don't know, it has been so long.
Page 4.
Q. What is your best judgment Mrs. Carson, 20
years ago~
A. It would be I guess, 30 years ago.
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Q. Were you ever married to Charles Carson
'vho was also known as H. F. Swann, also
known as Henry F·. Swann'
. .\. Yes, I was married to him but I never knew
anything about Swann.
Q. When and where were you married to this
Charles Carson'
A. It was in Dakota, but I can't think of the
nrune.
Q. What year~
A. It must be 25 or 30 years ago anyway.
Q. You have some recollection of the city, do
you know-Dakota and in what Dakota'
A. South Dakota, but it was a little bit of junky
town, terrible.
Page 5.
Q. What time of the year was. it~
A. It was the 23rd of I think February.
Q. And you think 20 to 25 years ago~
A. Yes. It was all of that.
Q. Would it be more than 25 ~
A. I think it would be.
Q. Would it be as many as 30 years~
A. It would be closer to 30.
Q. 30 years in Dakota~
A. Yes.
Page 6.
Q. Do you claim you are a common-law wife of
Mr. Carson or a le·gal wife~
A. I claim I am a legal wife.
Q. To best of your recollection is it between
25 or 30 years ago~ .
Page 7.
A. Yes.
Q. In S'Outh Dakota'
A. Yes.
Q. You had no children by Mr. Cars.on'
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A. No.
Q. You had no children by any other man~
A. Yes, I had a child with Mr. ____________, the first
husband but she is dead.
Q. Were you ever divorced from your first husband?
A. Yes.
Q. When and where!?
A. I don't know, I don't know really and truly.
Q. Did you ever have divorce papers?
A. Yes I did have a divorce. He always had
them.
Q. Who had them?
A. My husband.
Q. Which husband?
A. The first one.
Q. Did you obtain a divorce or he?
A. I got a divorce or asked for a divorce.
Q. Did you go to someone in Salt Lake City for
the divorce?
A. Yes, it was-I can't think of the name.
Page 10.

Q. How long before your marriage to Mr. Carson did you divorce your first husband?
A. My lands it was about ten years.
Page 12.

Q. You have only had two husbands you claim,
is that correct?
A. Yes, that is right.
Q. You were divorced from him before you married Mr. Carson?
A. Yes.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS TO BE RELIED
UPON
POINT I.
THAT THE JUDGEMENT IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE OF MRS. GRACE CARSON BEING A WIDOW AND
HEIR OF CHARLES CARSON.

POINT II.
THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR IS A TRUSTEE IN THE
BROADEST SENSE AND HELD TO THE SAME HIGH DEGREE OF STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TRUSTEE.

POINT III.
THAT THE DUTY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
IS LIMITED.

POINT IV.
FAILURE TO PERFORM THE DUTY TO MAKE DISCLOSURES WHICH RESTS UPON ONE BECAUSE OF
TRUST AS FRAUD FOR WHICH EQUITY IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION WILL RELIEVE AGAINST JUDGMENT.

POINT V.
ORDER OR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE AS PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST CLAIM OF ONE NOT NAMED THEREIN
WHO IS ENTITLED TO A SHARE OF AN ESTATE.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
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DENCE OF MRS. GRACE CARSON BEING A WIDOW AND
HEIR OF CHARLES CARSON.

We cite the case of In Re Pilcher's Estate, 114 Utah
72, 197 Pac. (2d) 143, and quote from the opinion of Justice. Pratt at page 147:
"We hold that where, as here, the first wife
attacks the validity of a marriage by her husband
to a second wife, then the burden of proof rests
with the. first wife, after proving her marriage,
to rebut the presumption of divorce arising from
the proof of the second marriage. In vie~w of the
many years that elapsed during which contestant
and deceased lived apart and with others in family
relationship, this case is particularly strong evidence of the merit of the rule."
We contend that the following evidence clearly discloses that Grace Catharine Sweney Carson could not
have been legally married to Charles Carson for the following reasons :
Exhrbit (W) is a certificate of marriage of R. C.
Tiller of Cincinnati, Ohio to Maydie Sherman of Cincinnati, Ohio dated the 13th day of September, 1899 at Covington, Kentucky. Exhibit (X), the 13th Census Report
of the United States, 1910, shows Henry F. Swann head
of the family, Maydie Swann, his wife:, Robert Swann,
son and Mildred S-wann, daughter, residing at 3302
Archer Street, Chicago, Illinois. Exhibit (B-1) is a certified copy of personal service of summons on R. C. Tiller
on the 23rd day of May, 1924, at Chicago, Illinois. Exhibit
(C-1), is a certified copy of divorce complaint; Exhibit
(D-1), certified copy of transcript of evidence; Exhibit
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(E-1), certified copy of Decree of Divorce of Maydie
Tiller fro1n R. C. Tiller on the 7th day of July, 1924 at
Cook County, Illinois.
These exhibits disclose that R. C. Tiller was married
to Maydie Sherman fron11899 until July 7, 1924. Mildred
Molinari, one of the plaintiffs, saw her father on -several
occasions at the death of her mother in Chicago in December of 1926 and she likewise talked with her father on
the street in Chicago in 1927.
Exhibit Y, being a letter of the decedent to George
E. Baker at Martin, South D·akota, identifies himself
as being H. F. Swann, of Vetal, South Dakota. This exhibit states:
"I wonder where my boy is-'Robby' you re-member him-I have not heard from him in years,
but how I wish I knew where he is now for after
what has taken place in Chicago I have not heard
or seen him since. Mildred is married and my
wife died and I wandered out to Cruifornia and
finally landed here about 15 years ago, went into
business and have been here very since."
This exhibit is dated January 16, 1944, so that 1'5
years prior would be January 1929 by the decedent's own
statement as to when he arrive-d in S-alt Lake.
As to Exhibit (Z) being a letter from the decedent
dated Ap·ril 6, 1947, to Mr. George E. Baker at Martin,
South Dakota, he recites within the letter:
"All in all, since I left S. D. most 18 or 20
years has been spent in Utah and I ha:ve no regrets for having come here."
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Further on in the letter the deeedent states :
"I have some property and money, about 20
grand. This of course belongs to the children if I
can find them."
This exhibit likewise indicates from the decedent's
own statements that he had left S.outh Dakota about 20
years before which would be 1927.
Edith Hazelrigg, who is the daughte·r of Grace
Catharine Sweney Carson, admits living with her mother
in Salt Lake City until1932 and that her mother was then
known by the name of Nicholls-or Sweney.
William L. Sanders identifies that his place of business was next to the decedent in 1936 on West South
Temple and that at that time, two women by the name
of Minnie and Grace were seen at the place of business
of the decedent.
Minnie Steffen who cleaned up the place of business
of the decedent on West Temple Street, which
would have to be in the year 1936 or prior thereto, testified that she had been working for the decedent almost
every day after she completed her W.P.A. sewing work,
cleaned up the store, numerous times cooking his meals
and that the decedent took her out to shoiWs and on numerous occasions proposed marriage to her which she
refused.
There will be no question that Charles Carson deceased, lived with Grace Catharine· Sweney Carson as
man and wife from approximately 1936, until the da.te
of his death, but that does not prove marriage· by which

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

47
Grace Carson could be a "·ido'v and heir. Exhibit (Y-1)
is the deposition of Grace Carson, taken November 2'6,
1948, at the L. D. S. Hospital, which date is subsequent
to the death of the decedent.
The 'vitness was asked questions and gave the following answers:

HQ.

,,~hen

did you first meet Mr. Carson~ (Page
3 Ex. Y-1)
~\. Right here in Salt Lake City.
Q. And what year?
A. I don't know. It has been so long.
Q. vVhat is your best judgment Mrs. Carson~
Tw. enty years ago~
Page 4.

A. It would be, I guess thirty years ago.
Q. Thirty years ago~ Were you ever married to
Charles Carson, who was also known as H.
F. Swann, also known as Henry F. Swann~
A. Yes, I was married to him, but I never knew
anything about Swann.
Q. When and where were you married to this
Charles Carson~
A. It 'vas in Dakota but I can't think of the
name.
Q. What year~
A. It must be 25 or 30 years ago anyway.
Q. Was it after the time you met Mr. Carson in
Salt Lake City, Utah~
A. 1res.
,
Q. And how did you happen to go to the Dako~tas
to be married~
A. I didn't go there to be married. I went to see
a woman, and, of course, I told him I was going, and he said he was going in a w:eek or so.
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Q. What time of the year wa.s it?
Page 5.
A. It was the 23rd of, I think February.
Q. And yoo think 20 to 2·5 years ago~
A. Yes, it was all of that.
Q. Would it be as many as 30 years~
A. It would be, close~r to 30.
Q. 30 years-in Dakota.~
A. Yes.
Q. Do you claim you are a common-law wife of
Mr. Carson or alegal wife·~
A. I claim I am a legal wife.
Q. To the best of your recollection it was between 25 or 30 years ~
A. Yes.
Q. In South Dakota.~
A. Yes.
Q. You had no children by any other man~
A. Yes, I had a child with Mr. ____________ , the first
husband, but she is dead.
Q. You have only had two husbands you claim,
is that correct~
A. That is right.
(
Q. You were divorced from him before you married Mr. Carson T
A. Yes."
We must assume that the evidence of Grace Carson
is p-roof of he:r purported marriage, thus at the bare
minimum 25 years from N ovembe~r 1928, would be No-vember, 1923, at which time Mr. Carson was still a married man, being married to Maydie Tille!r, who divorced
him the following year at Chicago, Illinois on July 7,
1924. By reason of the claim of Grace, Carson that it was
a legal marriage and not a common law marriage~, the
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question of her Inarria.ge n1nst be det.ertuined by a legal
marriage to Charles Carson.
Grace Carson as late as 193:Z 'va.~ residing with her
daughter, Edith Hazelrigg, and as late· as 1936 at the
West Temple Store of the decedent, Minnie Steffen was
proposed to by the decedent and Minnie Steffen was like'vise working for approximately four months prior to
the first appearance at the decedent's place of business of
· Grace, '\vho is identified as being Grace Carson, who
lived with the decedent after he removed his store from
West Temple to South Temple Street, and lived with
him as husband and wife until October 8, 1948, the date
of his death.
Charles Carson while discussing a real estate transaction with David Barclay in 1943 was asked by Mr.
Barclay, if she, referring to Grace Carson was not his
wife, he colored up and refused to answer. On other occasions concerning real estate transactions with both
David Barclay and L. J. Barclay, he stated that it was
his money and that it was none of Grace Carson's business and ~pon those instances went elsewhere for his
work to be done.
POINT II.
THAT AN ADMINISTRATOR IS A TRUSTEE IN THE
BROADEST SENSE AND HELD TO THE SAME HIGH DEGREE' OF STRICT ACCOUNTABILITY AS A TRUSTEE.

It is the fundamental principle that an executor or
administrator occupies a duty of high trust and is held
to a strict accountability under that trust.
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We quote from the case of Rice v. Rice, ------ Utah
______ , 212 Pac. (2d) 685, from the opinion of District Judge
Van Cott at page 689:
"Initially we desire to make it plain that an
executor or administrator occupies a position of
the highest trust and confidence not only to the
creditors and beneficiaries of an estate, but to the
court as well, and so he is required to act in entire
good faith. * • •
"Accordingly an executor is a trustee in the
broadest sense and is held to the same high and
strict accountability of a trustee."
Clearly, there can be no argument that Loren G.
Norton as administrator of the estate of Charles Carson,
deceased, would be held to a high and strict accountability as a trustee for heirs of this estate.
POINT III.
THAT THE DUTY OF A SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR
IS LIMITED.

"Sec. 102-4-15, U.C.A. 1943. Id. POWERS
AND DUTIES.
"The special administrator must collect and
preserve for the executor or administrator all the
goods, chattels, debts and effects of the decedent,
and all income's, rents, issues, p.rofits, claims and
demands of the estate; must take the charge and
management of, enter upon and preserve from
damage, waste and injury, the real estate, and for
such and all necessary p·urposes may commence
and maintain or defend actions and other legal
proceedings as an administrator, and exercise
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such other po,Yers as are conferred upon him by
his appoint1nent; but in no case is he liable to an
action by a.ny creditor on a cla.iln against the
decedent."
That the appointn1ent of Tracy Collins Trust Company as special administrator of the Charles Carson
Estate '"'as lhnited as follows:
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the
powers of the special administrator shall be limited to collection of goods, chattels, debts and estate
of the decedent and all incomes, rents, insurance,
profits and claims and demands of the estate and
to take charge and manage and for such and all
necessary purposes may commence and maintain
or defend actions or other legal p-roceedings as
an administrator, but in no case is said special
administrator liable to any action by any creditor
or a claim of decedent." (Ex. L-1)

In Re Pingree's Estate, 82 Utah 437, 25 Pac. (2nd)
937, Justice Elias Hansen at page 939 said :
"The duty of Mrs. Pingre·e 31S special administratrix was to preserve the property until a
general administrator was ap·p·ointed. Upon such
appointment, it became her duty in the absence
of an order of court to the contrary to render an
account and deliver the p·rope:rty of the estate
which had come into her poS~session to the: general administrator."
The duty of the special administrator was thus
limited and the only Order of Court for expenses in lo-cating heirs was the sum of $25.00 which was so nominal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52
that no extensive search in anywise could have been had.
Furth~r, that it was proper and not the duty of a special
administrator to make search for heirs as that comes
under the duties of a general administrator when so
qualified.
POINT IV.
F AlLURE TO PERFORM THE DUTY TO MAKE DISCLOSURES WHICH RESTS UPON ONE BECAUSE OF
TRUST AS FRAUD FOR WHICH EQUITY IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION WILL RELIEVE AGAINST JUDGMENT.

It is a fundamental principal that "an administrator or executor is under a duty to exercise the utmost
good faith in all his transactions regarding the estate.
While administrators and executors acting in good faith
are treated with indulgence, and not held answerable
on slight grounds, they will not be allowed to promote
their own personal interest to the injury of the heirs
at law, and any fraud upon the part of an executor or administrator, which tends to defeat the ends of the trust
reposed in him, will justify the court in de.claring his acts
void, whenever this can be done without prejudice to the
rights of innocent third persons." 21 Am. J ur, 515.
We do not cite authorities for these principles at
this point. The p·rinciple'S will be found reiterated time
and time again in the authorities hereinafter cited.
In the case of Aldrich v. Barton, et al (Cal.) 71 Pac.
169, in this action after there had been a distribution of
the estate to a trustee under the terms of the will the
trustee filed an account charging off certain iten1s' as
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sales of capital investment instead of being income to
'\\~hich

the 'Yidow 'vas entitled to a quarter share. The

account 'vas filed ":hile the 'vidow was in the H.awaiian
Isl'ands and ha.d no notice of the account or its contents
or the hearing thereof, except such notice as the court
ordered, viz: posting for ten days, and more than six
months had expired and likewise the time for appeal.
The court said at page 170 :
"The trustees took advantage of the absence
of the cestui que trust to present a false and
fraudulent petition to the court, and have it acted
upon without her knowledge. This was fraud upon
the court, as well as upon the absent inte:rested
party, and this is held to be a fraud "extrinsic to
the case," which prevented the plaintiff from be·ing properly represented at the hearing, or from
being represented at all. Sohler v. Sohle:r, 135
Cal. 323, 67 Pac. 282. In the Sohler Case the
fraudulent decree was the result of a conspiracy
between the trustee. and another, but the p~rinciple
of that case applies with equal force here, for
a fraud is equally abhorrent to equity, and is to be
measured by the same rules, whether it be· the result of conspiracy or arises from the corrupt motives of the trustee alone. The demurrer should
h~ve been overruled. We advise that the judgment
be reversed."

In the case of Riae v. Rice, ·-····- Utah ______ , 212 Pac.
(2) 685, the facts in this case we feel nee·d not be discus·sed, because they are undoubtedly clear in the courts
mind.
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District Judge Van Cott at

p~age

689 said:

"It is clea~ from the letters that appellant
was guilty of extrinsic fraud, and that the trial
court was justified in so finding. But quite apart
from the extrinsic fraud, the trial court was justified in vacating the order and decree on the
ground that the executor had not made to the
court a full and fair disclosure of the rights of respondent. * * •
"Here the executor in his capacity of residuary legatee was unjustly enriched by the construction placed by the court upon the will upon
his ex parte showing, to the impoverishment of the .
legatee entitled to her legacy. It was a fraud of
the most serious nature. It involved not only a
breach of fiduciary duty to the respondent but a
breach of duty to the court." * * *
"From the above citations it is quite apparent
that this Court has the power and authority to
deal with cases of the class pre!sented; that an
executor is a trustee owing an obligation to his
legatees and devisees and to the Court; and that a
petition to the Probate Court which misconstrues
the amount of a legacy or the construction of a
will is extrinsic fraud, and a fortiori where the
guilty executor stands to profit by his wrongful
act."
Further, at page 690, the Court said:
"Also having in mind that appellant by the
terms of the will was to have the land he was occupying, can it be said that a.ny executrix desiring
to carry out the terms of a will under such condition would not at least petition the Probate Court
for an interpretation of the will~ But respondent
did not do this. She proceeded to select the land
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on the "~est side of the high\\,.ay and give that to
appellant and she denied to him by the caprice
of her o•\vn judg1nent the barn property on the
east. This all was done by what she in effect concluded 'vas the infallibility of her own mind and
judgment to say nothing of the gain in land and
'vater she ",.as to profit by as one of the residuary
legatees. That she was fallible is shown by the
evidence and the finding in part of the Trial Court
in this matter. We believe that in view of the
above facts, together with the duty she owed to
appellant, she has not acted in good faith, and as
her interpretation of the will is not correct in that
it understates the amount he is entitled to, she has
been guilty of extrinsic fraud sufficient to justify
the intervention of a Court of Equity."
In the case of Hewett et al v. LinsteadJ et al (Cal.)
122 Pac. 352.
In this case one George Golden vvas pTedeceased
by his 'vife and the plaintiffs in this action are the heirs
at la-\v of ~Irs. Golden. That a portion of the· estate of
George Golden consisted of property which, during the
lifetime of his wife, was community property; that none
of the plaintiffs had any actual knowledge of the de·ath
of George Golden until after the final de.cree of distribution in his estate which was distributed to his. heirs.
Plaintiff first learned of the facts afteT the final decree
of distribution had been entered but while~ an ap·p·ea.l
was pending by a third p·erson.
Presiding Justice Pe~ters said at p.age 355 :
"Although there is some confusion in the
cases, we agree with plaintiffs that the better rule
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is that where a legatee knows of the existence of
other heirs, and, for the p·urpose of defrauding
such heirs, and benefiting himself, fails to notify
the court of the existence of such heirs, and knowingly files false petitions with the court representing there are no such heirs, he is guilty of extrinsic fraud warranting the imposition of a trust
on the fraudulent distributee's interest. In Mulcahey v. Dow, supra, it was impliedly held, and
in Monk v. Morgan, supra, it was expressly held,
that even in such a case the fraud is intrinsic and
is not extrinsic. The better-re,asoned cases, however, are in accord with the rule as aboiVe stated.
See Caldwell v. Taylor, 218 Cal. 471, at page 476,
et seq. where the cases are collected and discussed,
2'3 P. 2d 758, 88 A.L.R. 1194; United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed. 93; see also,
cases collected in annotations in 113 A.L.R. 1235;
88 A.L.R. 1201. * * *
"These cases establish that, where the executor or heir knowingly suppresses evidence of the
existence of other heirs with intent to defraud
them, the fraud is extrinsic warranting the equity
court in granting relief, but where the; executor
or heir acts in good faith the: decree is final and
conclusive and equity is without power to impose
a trust."
In the case. of Larrabee v. Tracy, et al, (Cal.) 134
Pa.c. (2d) 26'5.
In this action Mrs. Larrabee, was the child of Kate
Chase who was a legatee under the will of Mark H. Rice.
The executor who was also the residuary legate,e advised
Mrs. Larrabee of the will and that the one,-sixth inte~r
est in the estate would revert to her. On the third account
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the executor asked for a construction of the will alleging Kate Chase predecease.d the testator and that the
will disinherited all persons other than those specifically
narned therein including the decedent of Kate Chase and
that this devise "'"ould lapse and become part of the residue. Notice of hearing was by posting only. This petition was granted and decreed that Mrs. Larrabee was
not entitled to any of the estate. l\Irs. Larrabee learned
from her almt later that the aunt's devise had been paid
and so commenced this action.
The Court said at page 268:
"The evidence shows that ap·pellant led respondent to believe that she was entitled to the
share of the estate her mother would have received had she survived the testator, and that distribution would be made accordingly as soon as a
fair price could be obtained for the real property
in the estate. In correspondence covering a period
of over five years appellant never at any time indicated that there was any question concerning
respondent's right to be substituted in -her
mother's place. Appellant seeks to justify this
conduct by claiming that he 'erroneously belie~ved'
that the bequest and devise to Kate Chase 'reverted' to respondent upon the de!ath of Kate
Chase and that it was not until about the time
the petition for distribution was filed that he
'was advised and determined' that he. was in
error. This, of course, does not excuse appellant's
failure to notify Mrs. Larrabee that he had
changed his position and intended to ask the
court to distribute to himself the legacy Mrs.
Larrabe·e had been led to belie·ve she would reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ceive. Without informing Mrs. Larrabee of his
intentions, appellant presented his adverse claim
to the probate court stating as a fact that her
share had lapsed. Appellant prosecuted his petition knowing full well that respondent would not
be in court to challenge his claim to her share of
the estate. Wellman's conduct effectively prevented Mrs. Larrabee from obtaining a fair adversary hearing and, in our opinion, affords ample
justification for the granting of equitable re!lief.
As executor of the estate and its residuary legatee
appellant had a clear duty to refrain from taking
an unfair advantage of the impression he had created. An executor has numerous fiduciary obligations to the beneficiaries of the estate. In 1 Scott
on Trust (1939) it is stated (#6, P. 48) 'An executor is often called a trustee·; and in the broad
sense of the term so he is. * * * The relation between an executor or administrator and the legatees and distributees, like that between a trustee
and the beneficiaries of the trust, is a fiduciary
relation.'"
The Court further said at page 269:

_

_..

"While it may be tha.t appellant would not
have been guilty of a breach of duty had he given
res.ponde·nt actual notice. that he intended to dispute her right to the· legacy, allorwing sufficient
time for her to obtain an attorney to re:pre.sent
he.r in the probate hearing, it would be unconscionable for a court of equity to hold that, under the
circumstances of this case, he had fulfilled his
obligations by compliance. with the statutory requirements of (posting notice at the courthouse."
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In the case of Purinton r. Dyson (Cal.) 65 Pa.c. 2d

777.
This is an action involving- a pretermitted heir. The
decedent Adeline Potter died testate leaving- as her only
heirs Thomas Purinton a son, and respondent who is a
daughter of a deceased son. By he:r Will Mrs. Potte!r
bequeathed $100.00 to her son and $50.00 to Dyson an.d
the residue. of the estate to a Schaffer who was also
executor. Schaffer presented the will for probate, by a
petition stating that the only heir at law was decease:d's
son. Schaffer was ap·pointed and qualified and on p·etition for distribution under oath stated that the p:ers:ons
entitled to distribution were tho1se named in the will.
Distribution of the estate was had and the following
year Schaffer died leaving the bulk of his estate to Dyson. The Court in Bank at page 779 said:
"However, it is difficult to see how fraud
could be practiced more directly upon one entitle:d
to present his rights to a court than by keeping
him in ignorance of the p·roceedings. It is true
that in most cases of extrinsic fraud the defendant has said something directly to the p·e!rson
whose rights were involved amounting to re~pre:..
sentations that it was not necessary for such
person to take any part in the proceedings. In
other cases, acts have been held to amount to
such re.p~resentations. But the rule allowing the
maintenance of an action in equity for extrinsic
fraud should not be limited so strictly as to
require as a basis evidence of rep~resentations
made dire·ctly to the one defrauded.
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"In this case notice of the hearings of Schaffer's petitions was required to be served upon
the heirs of the testator either pe·rsonally or by
mail. Section 328, Probate Code!. Schaffer as
the proponent of the will in the first instance and
as the duly qualified and appointed exe.cutor
thereof after it was admitted to probate was
charged with the utmost good faith to the heirs
of the deceased and to the court. It was his duty
to see that notice of the proceedings was given
to those whom he knew to be heirs of Mrs. Potter.
The same situation was considered in the case
of Zare:mba v. Woods (Cal. app·.) 61 P. (2d) 976,
980. There the executor of a will also presented
a petition stating that the deceased left no heirs.
It was claimed, as it is here, that his representation amounted to intrinsic but not extrinsic fraud.
But the court held that the allegation constituted
extrinsic fraud, saying: "There is a clear line of
demarcation, however, between a statement made
in the petition for the probate of the will which
would limit the giving of notices to heirs, and
te·stimony in court to the effect that there were
no such heirs, after the heirs had been notified
of the proceeding for the p·robate of the will, as
provided by the different sections of the Probate
Code."
·
"Whatever may have been the motive of
Schaffer, whether it was induced by the agreement which the court found he made· with Mrs.
Potter's son, or by some orther reason, his acts
in suppressing all information concerning re'""
spondent and representing Thomas Purinton to
be the only son of the deceased, runounts to fraud
practiced directly against the respondent. They
furnish abundant foundation for a judgment holding him to have been a trustee· for the. prope,rty
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"~hich

should haYe been distributed to the respondent but 'vhich he 'Yrongfully received.''

In the case of Caulk v. Lowe (Okla.), 178 Pac. 101.
In this case Judge K. Clingan died inte,state and
one Fannie ~f. Caulk filed a petition that she was the
only heir of the decedent and had her husband appointed
administrator and later filed an account and final settlement which account was approved and thH administrator
discharged. On the day following the discharge· Fannie
M. c·aulk filed a petition for designation of heirship and
on the same day the Court entered Findings that Fannie
!f. Caulk was the sole and only heir at law of the. deceased. Three years late.r Mary c·. Lowe, claiming to
be the legitimate daughter o.f the decedent filed her p·e:tition to have vacate.d the final order discharging the
administrator and the order dete·rmining heirship. The
Court entered judgment on behalf of Mary Lowe. and
an appeal is taken therefrom.
The Court said at page 106 :
"The· weight of evidencH discl~osed that fraud .
was practiced by the defendant by withholding
from the county court information had by Fannie
M. Caulk and Otto Caulk at the time· the application was made for the appointment of Otto
Caulk as administrator, and at all the subsequent
proceedings in the case, that Mary C. Lowe was
the daughter of the decedent and an heir of his
estate which resulted in having the said Fannie
M. C~ulk wrongfully adjudged the sole heir of
Judge K. Clingan, deceased. That the orde-rs and
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judgment involved in the instant case which were
sought to be· set aside is a probate matter does
not admit of question, and therefore. the district
court had jurisdiction of the appeal from the
county court sitting in probate.
"It therefore clearly appears that the county
court and district court had jurisdiction, and
that the contention of proposition one is without
merit.
"The great weight of the evidence shows that
Judge K. Clingan and Angeline Sisk were legally
n1arried in accord with the laws of Tennessee,
and the said Mary C. Lowe was the result of such
nnion; therefore there can be no question that the
said Mary C. Lowe is an heir of the estate of
Judge K. Clingan, deceased, and the undisputed
record of the county court, together with the evidence in the case, conclusively showing that the
fraud alleged to have been perpetrated by Fannie
M. Caulk and Otto Caulk upon the county court
sitting in probate was perpetrated, and that no
notice whatever was given Mary C. Lnwe of any
of the proceedings had in the court which resulted
in declaring Fannie M. Caulk the sole heir of the
said e~state, the county court never acquired jurisdiction of Mary C. Lowe, and that, therefore the
orders and judgment as to her were void; which
findings of the court of facts, and the judgment
rendered, are not eontrary to the weight of the
evidence in the case, and therefore the second
p·roposition is without weight.
"The court in its. findings found that Mary
C. Lowe, the petitioner, was the legitimate child
of Judge K. Clingan; and, having s·o found, it
was entirely immaterial whether or not Mary C.
Lowe was ever recognized by the decedent as a
member of his family, as a le·gitimate. child is
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an heir regardless of \Yhether or not it 'vas ever
recognized as a n1en1ber of its father's family, or
"'"hether or not the father ever lived with the
family in 'vhich such child reside,d, and it was
unnecessary for tl1e court to find 'vhether or not
:Jiary C. Lo,ve \Yas ever received in the fan1ily of
the decedent.
~'The court fotmd that in withholding the
information that she should have given the probate court in her petition for administration arid
the other proceedings in the case in the said
probate court that Fannie M. Caulk practiced a
fraud upon the court. It is entirely unimportant
in this ease as to whether or not her husband, Otto
Caulk, participated in this fraud, and the:refore it
was not neeessary for the court to make any
findings as to the action of Otto c·aulk.
"The court found that Judge K. Clingan and
the mother of Mary C. Lowe, Angeline Sisk, were
legally married.
"The court found that this action was not
barred by limitation.
"Hence the court found upon every question
of fact upon which the defendant requested findings of facts. It is true that the court did not find
the facts as defendant desired, but this is not an
error."
In the case of J orgens en v. Jorgensen (Cal.), 193
Pac. 2d, page 728.
This is a case of where husband and wife had
entered into a separation agreement and the: wife subsequently obtained a divorce based upon the statement
of assets agreed upon by the parties. The wife then
brought this action to set aside the deeree of divorce
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based upon misrepresentation of the separate and community property as disclosed by the statements on which
the divorce was obtained.
The Court said at page 732 :
"The latter policy applied when a party's
adversary, in violation of a duty arising from a
trust or confidential relation, has concealed from
him facts essential to the protection of his rights,
even though such facts concerned issued invoJved
in the case in which the judgment was entered.
"The failure to perform the duty to speak or make
disclosures which rests upon one· because of a
trust or confidential relation is obviously a fraud,
for which equity may relieve from a judgffient
thereby obtained, even though the breach of duty
occurs during a judicial proceeding and involves
false testimony, and this is true, whethe~r such
fraud be~ regarded as extrinsic or as an exception
to the extrinsic fraud rule." 3 Freeman Judgments, 5th Ed., p. 2576; see: Laun v. Kipp, 155
Wis. 347, 145 N.W. 183, 5 A.L.R. 655."
In the case of Crow v. Mads en, et al. (Cal.), 111
Pac. (2d), page 7.
In this case Martin C. Madsen was a son or.f Hanne
Madsen and was made executor of he·r last will which
gave to Helen Crow $3100.00. Madsen upon becoming
exeeutor reported to the court that there was no prope~ty
in his hands and claimed ceTtain real estate· of his mother
by re·ason of assignment and deed leaving nothing to
probate in her estate. The plaintiff brought this. action
claiming fraud on the part orf the executor and was granted a judgment.
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The Court said on page 15 :
H''rhen he a.eeepted the position of executor
of the Hanne. ~la.dsen estate he beca1ne not only
an officer and agent of the court but a trustee for
the beneficiaries under the '"'ill of Hanne Madsen
of '"'hich plaintiff '"'as one. He then owed the duty
to the court and to plaintiff to disclose. every
n1aterial fact 'Yithin his knowledge bearing on
the property of the estate or of any interest therein. He failed to perforn1 his duty, which, undeT
the decisions we have cited was extrinsic fraud.
If the allegations of the amended complaint are
true, "~hich we must assume at this stage' of the
proceedings, he went furtheT than the passive act
of concealment and took the positive position of
representing to the court that Hanne Madsen
had no ·property nor estate at the time of heT
death. Whether or not this representation was
intrinsic or· extrinsic fraud, it is not necessary to
decide, as the extrinsic fraud of breach of duty
by conceahnen t is sufficient.
"We have, therefore, reached the conclusion
that the fraud alleged in the ame:nded complaint
is extrinsic and sufficient to sustain the action."
In the case of Anderson v. Lyons, 32 N.W. 2d 849.

In this case one Claes Willander died testate in
ldaho and bequeathed $1000.00 to his brother Ander J.
A.nderson who predeceased him and the residue of the
estate to his nieces and nephews. The. plaintiff was
Ander's adopted son and was a resident of Minnesota.
The will was probated in the state of Idaho in which
the plaintiff did not share in the estate and p·laintiff
alleged that it was defendant's duty to bring to the
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Court's attention that plaintiff was entitled to Ander's
le~gacy and to a share as a nephew but that the defendant
knowingly and intentionally failed to name the plaintiff
in the petition for probate of the will and to bring to
the Court's attention that plaintiff was entitled to share
in the distribution of the estate and that these facts
were concealed from the Court and by such concealment
plaintiff was intentionally defrauded of his share of
approximately $5000.00.
The. Court at page 851 said:
"Knowingly and intentionally concealing from
and failing to disclose to the probate court in
probate proceedings the existence of a person
interested in the estate so that such person is by
decree deprived of his in teT·est in the e·state constitutes extrinsic fraud against which such person
is entitled to equitable relief. Annotation, 113
A.L.R. 1235. The Annotation collects numerous
cases involving the· question.
"In Schmitz v. Martin, 149 Minn. 386, 183
N.W. 978, we applied the rule, but without stating
whether the fraud there was extrinsic or intrinsic.
There, a daughter of decedent with knowledge of
the faet that plaintiff was decedent's son's. widow
stated in the petition for the probate of his will,
devising his. farm to decedent's widow for life
with remainder over to his son and daughte~r,
that decedent's son left no issue and that dooe\,.
dent's widow and daughter were (149 Minn. at
page 388, 183 N.W. at page 979) "all of the heirs
and dervisees" of decedent, and made no mention
of plaintiff, thereby knowingly and intentionally
concealing from the probate court plaintiff's exist-
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ence a~ decedent's son's \Yido\Y and heir and the
final decree of distribution follo\\yed the: petition
reciting the allegations as to decedent's only
heirs being his \\Tido'v and daughter. There the
son's \Yido,Y, \Yho "Tas defrauded as an he:ir, was
a nonresident of this state, where the probate
proceedings \Yere had, the san1e as plain tiff here
was a non-resident of Idaho, where the p·robate
proceedings here \Yere had. We held that the evidence established fraud entitling plaintiff to equitable relief setting aside the probate de:ere.e and
establishing her right to the share of deeedent's
estate wrongfully diverted from her by a probate
decree; that, \vhile a probate de.cree is final and
conclusive as to all matters thereby adjudicated
(149 Minn. at page 387, N.W. at p-age 979) "it
may be assailed and set aside in a direct proceeding for that purpose, on the ground of fraud";
and that an action for equitable relief, s.uch as
there, to establish and enforce rights constitutes
a direct attack upon the final decree,."
In the case of Hewitt v. Hewitt, 17 Fed. Rep. 2d,

710.
In this case the appellant was adopted by Hewitt
in 1872 in Kansas and about two ye:ars after the, adoption the appellant was taken from his custody by Court
order because of cruel and inhuman treatme,nt. After
the separation the appellant did not communicate with
Hewitt 'and p·urposely avoided giving his any notice·. of
his whereabouts for fear that he would disinherit him

by will. In 1921 the ap·pellant had attorneys employed for
him in Los Angeles to check and see if Hewitt was still
living in that city. The residence listed for Hewitt was
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phoned and a statement was made that he was down
town. These facts were then communicated to Hewitt
through his counsel. On January 9, 1922, Hewitt died
at Los Angeles leaving his only heirs his widow, a
daughter by a previous marriage and the appeUant.
Seven months after the death of Hewitt the. Los Angeles
attorneys again were requested to check to detennine if
Hewitt was still living and upon phoning the Hewitt
home was informed that he was out of town for a few
W&3ks. The widow of the deceased at the time of the
latter phone call was in the east and during her absence
the property was being cared for by a friend. Appellant
first learned of the death of Hewitt in June of 1925 but
in the meantime Letters Testamentary had be:en taken
out, the administration of. the estate had been closed,
and the estate distributed to the widow ·and daughter
as sole heirs at l'aw. In the petition for letters of administration filed by the widow and in the: petition for distribution of the estate no reference was made to the.
fact that appellant was an heir or that he ever e~xisted.
During Hewitt's lifetime he executed three wills,
each of which devised the sum of $10.00 to his adopted
~on. The widow had seen these wills after he~r marri'age
and was familiar with their contents. She questioned
Hewitt in refere:nce to the adopted son and was informed
by him that he had such a son but that he had been given
back to his parents and he had heard that the son was
dead. The knowledge thus gained by the Widow was not
communicated to .the attorney in the settlement o£ .the
estate nor to the court in which- the estate· wa.s admin-
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istered. Hewitfs daughter had no notice that the appellant had ever been adopted by her father or that such
a person existed.
The Court at page 718 said :
~~Here,

by reason of the trust and confidential
relation existing between the· p·artie.s, a positive
duty rested on the administratrix to fully advise
the court as to all facts and all information in
her possession concerning the heirs of the de.cedent and their whereabouts. This duty she: wholly
failed to discharge, and the reas.on for her failure
cannot be accepted. She knew that her husband
had an adopte·d son, and the only knowledge or
information she had as to his de·ath was the bare
statement of her husband that he had been so
reported to him, but where, when, or by whom
she was not advised. Furthermore, she· knew that
her husband had made provision for the adopted
son by will as late as June 1920, thus indicating
that he himself did not give full credence to the
report of his death. She made no inquiry for
the adopted son, at his last known place of address
or elsewhere, and maintained silence solely be.cause of the hearsay statement made to her by
her husband some years before. Had she communicated all of these facts to the: court, it is not
at all likely that a decree of distribution would
have be·en entered without directing further investigation or inquiry-at least we have a right
to so presume. Nor will we: speculate as to what
might have happ·ened, had S'he p·ursued the proper
course.
"But it is said that, if her mere silence constituted fraud, it was intrinsic fraud, against
which a court of equity is powerless to grant
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relief, and United States v. Throckmorton, 98
U. S. 61, 25 L. Ed 93, is cite·d. * * *
"On the other hand, the doctrine is equally
well settled that the court will not set aside a
judgment becauie it was founded on a fraudulent
instrument, or perjured evidence, or for any matter which was actually presented and considered
in the judgment assailed."
But in the same connection it was further
said:
"But there is an admitted exception to this
general rule in cases where, by reason of some·thing done by the successful party to a suit, the.re
was in fact no adversary trial or decision of the
issue in the case. Whe·re· the. unsuccessful party
has been prevented from exhibiting fully his
case, by fraud or deception p-racticed on him by
his opponent, as by keeping him away from court,
a false. promise of a compromise; or where the
defendant ne·ver had knowledge of the suit, being
kept in ignorance by the acts of the plain tiff ; or
where an ·attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a party and connives at his defeat; or where the attorney regularly employed corruptly sells out his client's
interest to the othe·r side.- these, and similar
cases, which show that there has ne·ver been a
real contest in the trial or he!aring of the case,
are reasons for which a ne1w suit may he sustained
to set aside and annul the former judgment or
decree, and op·en the case for a new and a fair
hearing."
"This case·, we think, falls within the exce~p
tion, and not within the general rule. Here the
appellant was prevented from presenting a claim
for his portion of the estate: by the fraudulent
conduct of the administratrix, and there has been
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no adYersary trial or decision of any issue as
between the parties to the present suit. The ap·pellees frankly concede that, if the appellant had
been prevented fron1 making claim to the estate
because of some fraudulen:t statement or misrepresentation on the part o£ the administratrix, a
court of equity would readily grant relief, but it
is contended that mere silence on her part presents an entirely different question. But there
can be no sound distinction between the giving of
false information and the failure~ to give correct
information, where the giving of the latte.r is a
matter of legal duty.

In the case of Weyant et al. v. Utah Savings & Trust
Co., 54 Utah 181, 182 Pac. 189.
In this case Harvey Weyant abandoned his wife
and children in Springfield, Mass., in 1890 and elop·ed
with a Rosella ~!cintyre to parts unknown but he died
in Salt Lake City, Utah in July, 1910 unde·r the. name of
Harvey W. Fuller where he had. been in business and
lived with Rosella Fuller as man and wife. Rosella
Fuller probated his estate as his lawful wife and only
surviving heir when she knew that decedent had a wife
and children as lawful heirs and that she had no right
OF claim to any prope·rty. She thereafter conducted all
proceedings and had distributed to her the full estate
but it was found that she failed to inventory certain
property which she ap·pr~~priated to her own use.
T·he Court at page 199 said:
"In this case, however, the administratrix,
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ly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty
imposed upon her by law and by the bond that
is sued on. It was the duty of the administratrix,
under the law, to publish proper notice, so as to
apprise the heirs, and all others interested in the
estate, of its true condition; and when she failed
to do that, but published notice in a false and
fictitious name, known to her to be so, she utterly
failed to "faithfully execute the duties of the trust
according to law," a.s provided in the. bond. Nor
did she, as the bond provided, administer the
estate "for the use of the heirs" of the deceased,
as she was bound to do. Nor did the wrongs commi tte.d by her occur after the decree of distribution, nor when acting in a capacity orther than
that of administratrix. It is sometimes somewhat
difficult to determine whether the wrongful acts
complained of occurred at a time when the administrator is acting as s.uch, or whe,ther the:y occurred after he had ceased to so act and acted in a
different capacity. Sometimes the administrator
may act in a dual capacity, one. as administrator
and the other as trustee, etc. There may thus be
circumstances,. as is well stated in some' of the
cases, where an administrator may have defrauded an heir while acting as trustee, and after he
had ceased to act as administrator.
"In the probate proceeding here in question,
however, the administratrix not only failed to
p·ublish proper notice., so far as respondents are
concerned, but she utterly failed to make and
return a true and complete inventory of the property belonging to the estate. Again she: converted
to he:r own use about $12,000 worth of prope~rty
of the estate without making an inventory thereof, and without disclosing its existence~. That act
alone constituted an insufferable fraud and mani-
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festly constituted a breach of the bond. 18 Cyc.
p. l~G7. ~loreover, all of her acts \Vhich resul'ted
in despoiling respondents of their inheritance
occurred during the adn1inistration of the estate,
and not after the decree of distribution ha;d been
entered, and 'vhen the administratrix wa.s acting
in a private capac-ity, or in a capacity of trustee
1nerely. T·rue, she was awarded possession and
control of the property which was inventoried,
and 'vhich 'vas left for distribution, by the decree
of distribution; but that decree was directly
based upon extrinsic fraud practiced by her,
w·hich fraud likewise constituted a breach of the
bond in question here.
In the case of Barrette v. Whitney, 36 Utah 574, 106
Pac. 522.
Justice Frick at page 527 said:
"While the court may assume that, as a
matter of law, and for the purpose of jurisd~
tion, both the known and the unknown heirs are
before the court, yet, whether the heirs are living
in different states or otherwise:, it cannot be p·resumed that a prudent and careful judge would
ordinarily proceed to distribute without notice to
the heirs or to some accredited person re!presenting them.
·
"There are various provisions in the statute
by which full power and discretion is vested in
the probate court with respect to the time· and
manner of giving n.otice during the course of
administration, and the court may thus, in every
case, suit the n~tice to the circumstances and
conditions confronting it. But the mere fact that
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such notices may be provided for does not necessarily make them jurisdictional."
In the case of Child et al. v. District Court of Second
Judicial Dist. et al., 80 Utah 243, 14 Pac. (2d) 1110.
District Judge Worthen said at page 1111:
"His right to notice of all proceedings is
important; sales of property, mortgages, and
family allowance, all affect his rights, and if he
is in fact an heir, he should be afforded an opportunity to be heard in respect thereto. Until his
heirship is established, his right to petition for
distribution does not exist, and he may be required to stand by until the recognized heirs
may desire distribution, in order to establish his
claim. The p~roof available to establish his heirship when he files his petition may be unavailable
when the time for distribution arrives."
The holding in the abo~e cases has been retiterated
in the appellate courts of many other jurisdictions. S.ee
for example:
In re Ross' Estate (Cal.), 73 Pac. 976;
Jones v. Arnold, 221 S.W. (2d) 187;
Ferguson v. Wachs, et al., 96 Fed. (2d) 910;
In re. Bailey's Estate, 238 N.W. 845;
Appeal of O'Neal, 11 Atl. 856;
State v. Vincent, et al. (Ore.), 52 Pac. (2d)
203·
Sears v. 'Rule (Cal.), 114 Pac. (2d) 57.
1

Plaintiffs and Appellants contend that Mrs. Grace
Carson knew of the fact of their existence by reason of
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discussions eoncerning the deeedenfs children \rith the
witnesses Jean Sinclair, nlinnie Steffen and Agnes C.
Teeter, the latter \Yith "rhon1 Grace (~arson discussed the
children of the decedent as late as the evening of the
Rosary held for the decedent, and yet filed petition for
Letters of . .L\.dministration stating that there were no
known heirs other than herself. She further discussed
the fact that there "~ere no children with the defendant
E. LeRoy Shields a.s the attorney for the Estate of Charles Carson in \Yhich Objections, Cross-Petitions and
Amended Petitions were filed in her behalf. Likewise
Grace Carson knew at all times herein mentioned that
she had never been legally married to the decedent between the years 1919 and 1923 which would be 25 to 30
years before the date of taking her deposition and is
her statement for the date of a legal marriage in South
Dakota.
The defendant Loren G. Norton discusse.d with the
decedent within the last few months of his life the fact
that ·the decedent had two children whom he had be.en
searching for in Chicago and could not find. On the
death of the decedent Norton calle;d H. C. Castello at
To~edo, Ohio who told him there: were. children but that
he didn't know anything of them and that Mr. Carson
hadn't heard from them for a good many years. Further,
Norton inquire:d in and about the neighborhood of the
decedent's residence: and was advised by various pe:titions at the hearings of which he: was present in Court
and heard discussed that there were: two children tha.t
were heirs living in Chicago when last heard of in 1944,
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and various receipts were introduced (Exhibit T-1),
showing that the decedent was paying on a land assessment de~al at Chicago, Illino[s as late as 1947 in his own
name as Henry F. Swann, in the name of his son Robert
V. Swann, in the name of his daughter Mildred Swann
and in the name of Mrs. H. F. Swann, his deceased wife.
And further that the notices of these assessments were
sent to Henry F. Swann, 176¥2 West South Temple
Street, New Villa Hotel, Salt Lake City, Utah, care of
Carson and Carson. Even though defendant Norton
knew these facts he never disclosed to the Court at any
time the fact that he had knowledge that there were two
purported heirs.
Defendant Norton had published notice to creditors
in the Estate of Charles Carson by July 15, 1949 and,
yet he was not formally appointed Administrator of said
Estate until July 22, 1949 by reason of Findings, Conclusions and Decree of Judge Joseph G. Jeppson. Can
it thus be said that there was Notice to Credito~s published by a duly appointed, qualified and acting Administrator.
The defendant Loren G. Norton never at any time
during the administration of the: Charles Carson Estate
had any notice forwarded to the plaintiffs of any kind.
Further the two orde:rs obtained for widow's allowance
were without any notice at all, and the hearing for
Petition for Distribution was had only by p.osting of
notices.
The defendant Loren G. Norton further well knew at
the time of filing the Petition for Distribution in the
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Charles Carson Estate that he and his wife Gloria Norton 'vere the residuary beneficiaries unde,r the Will of
Grace Carson and that they would materially bene·fit by
not 1nentioning to the Court on final distribution that
the plaintiffs were heirs of the decedent Charles c·arson
and that their particular inheritance unde~r the, Will of
Grace Carson "~ould be many times more if the plaintiffs
did not inherit and even assuming that Grace Carson
was a widow and entitled to one-third of the Estate of
Charles Carson, Deceased. Further it is peculiar that
two independent witnesses would testify to the fact that
Loren G. Norton did attemp·t to have a Power of Attorney signed by the decedent Charles c·arson a few days
before his death and while in a physical condition after
strokes that his hand would have to be held to even mark
an "X" on the Power of Attorney. Is it not likewise
peculiar that the Blue Foot L.ocke,r containing all the
evidence of the value of the Estate of Charle.s c·arson
should have been removed by this defendant from the
premises of J e:an's Rest Home and that even Mrs. Grace
Carson stated that she did not desire to have the defe.ndant Norton have possession of the box as it contained all
the contracts and papers evidencing indebtedness of
other parties including this defendant in the sum of
$4000.00. Likewise defendant Norton required a formal
demand on the part of the Sp~e:eial Administrator to
.relinquish the evidence of the assets of the Estate (Exhibit R-1). Defendant Norton likewise made arrangements for all residences of Grace Carson afte·r the~ death
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ber 4, 1949. This defendant paid to Grace Carson two
$150.00 payments between October 8, 1948 and June 20,
1949 which sum of $300.00 was not payment to the Estate
of Charles Carson and was not evidenced in the Inventory of the Charles Carson Estate. Furthermore there
have never been any receipts filed in thei Charles Carson
Estate nor has the Administrator or his Bondsmen been
discharged and yet the assets of the Charles Carson
Estate were. turned over to the defendant E. LeRoy
Shields, as Executor of the Estate of Grace Carson,
Deceased.

We contend that the foregoing facts show a fraudulent method between the defendant Loren G. Norton
and Mrs. Grace Carson to the date of her death by which
the District Court on distribution of the Estate of
Charles Carson would never be advised by the Administrator of his knowledge of two heirs who were entitled
to inherit.
POINT V.
ORDER OR DECREE OF DISTRIBUTION OF DECEDENT'S ESTATE AS PROTECTION OF ADMINISTRATOR AGAINST CLAIM OF ONE NOT NAMED THEREIN
WHO IS ENTITLED TO A SHARE OF AN ESTATE.

The defendants and respondents in this action take
the position that there was a determination of heirship
on the question of the apporintment of the administrator
and by the· deere:e of distribution which is. final and theTefore res judicata.
The position of plaintiff and

app~eJlant

is that the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

79
hearing. on petition for letters of ndntinist.ration eould
not be a determination of heirship as there '"as no person
representing plaintiffs or in priYity 'v-ith then1 and tl1at
the ·order of Judge Jeppson appointing amninistrator
n1e.rely designates the preference of ~Irs. Carson for
filing.
In the case of In Re Ste~·ens Estate, 102 U. 255, 130
Pac. (2d) 85, the Court said on page 85 :
h~-\.s

'vas pointed out in the. case of In re ListInan's Estate, 57 lTtah 471, 197 P. 596, 600: "It
Ina.:~ "~ell be conceded that when an executor (or
administrator) in the discharge of his trust ha.s
exercised that degree of care which a pirudent
person ordinarily exercises in the conduct and
management of his own affairs, the law, in case
of loss, will hold him immune from personal
liability. He is not an insure-r, and if he exercises
ordinary care and diligence in the. performance
of his duties he may not be held for mistake or
error in judgment."
In the case of Welch v. Flory et al. (Mass.), 200
N.E. 900.
In this case it involves a decree of distribution of
Agnes vV elch who died intestate in 1929, the. respondent,
the husband of a niece of the intestate was appointed
administrator and in his petition stated that decedent
left no husband and as her only heirs at law W Hlch the
petitione.r herein, described as her brother, and other
persons described as nephews and nieces and the residence of petitioner was stated to be Boston, Mass. On
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to were named only as nieces and nephews and made no
1nention of the petitioner and distribution of the estate
was had upon that petition. At the. time of his appointment as administrator his wife: informed him that
James Welch, the petitioner was about 72 years of age
and living at 115 Holton Street in the Brighton District
where he had lived for 15 years. During the time he
voted and paid taxes in Boston. For the: purpose of
notifying him of his sister's death the respondent made
inquiry of two or three of the next of kin living in Lynn
and was informed by some of them that a man named
Comeau living in Lynn would probably know about the
p·etitioner, James Welch. ·He asked them to see Comeau
and make inquiry as to the whereabouts of petitioner
and afterwards the wife of the respondent informed him
that one of the next of kin had telephoned her saying
that they had seen Come~au and that he had told them he
did not know where the petitioner was. The respondent
later went to the City Hall at Malden but could find no
record of James Welch and he also wrote two of the
next of kin in Nova Scotia but was unable to get any
information from them regarding Welch. The respondent did not make any examination of the city records in
Boston. Comeau, as a matter of fact, had called upon
petitioner at various times and did know where he lived
but the respondent never p·ersonally saw Comeau or
communicated with him directly. The respondent testified that he believed that p·etitioner had died without
issue although he was not so informed by anyone who
had actual knowledge of his death. The trial judge~ found
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that the petitioner

\Va~

entitled to one-fourth of the

balance of the estate.
The Court said at page 816:
"The general rule is that those. acting in trust
capacity must exercise not only good faith but
also sound judgment in the performance of their
duties. They must use that degree of intelligence
and diligence \vhich a man of average ability and
ordinary prudence under such responsibility
":ould exercise in like circumstances. That rule
finds its most frequent illustration in the investment of trust funds and the. management of trust
estates. Kimball v. Whitney, 233 Mass. 321, 123
N.E. 665. Springfield Safe Deposit ·& Trust Co.
v. First Unitarian Society (Mass.), 200 N.E. 541.
The rule is not confined in its operation to those
cases, but as shown by Cleveland v. Draper, 194
Mass. 118, 80 N.E. 227, extends to an administrator in respect to his conduct in making distribution of an intestate estate in conformity to a
decree of court.
"There is no express finding in the case at
bar that the respondent was ne·gligent. The;re is
the finding that the respondent acted honestly
and in good faith. That, howeve-r, is. not enough.
Not infrequently, trustees whose conduct has met
that standard have been compelled to make good
losses to the trust fund solely because of failure
to exercise sound judgment in investments. There
is no finding in terms that the respondent eonformed to the general rule of conduct just stated.
It is found, however, that by exercising more. diligence he might have located the petitioner, or
ascertained that he was living. The facts found
_and already narrated show that the respondent
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was mildly active, if not actually slothful, in his
atte1npt to locate the petitioner. He was described in the respondent's petition for administration as a brother of the intestate, resident in
Boston. Of course that description did not establish the fact. Hopkins v. Treasurer & Receiver
General, 276 Mass. 502, 177 N.E. 654. If that
statement had come to the attention of the judge
it can hardly be thought that the decree; of distribution would have been entered on October 17,
1930. See· Withington v. Fidelity & Casualty Co.,
237 Mass. 73, 78, 129 N.E. 418. The respondent
did not personally see or communicate with, or
even write to Comeau in Lynn, who in fact knew
about the petitioner, but instead of making genuine investigation, the respondent accepted an
unreliable hearsay report that Comeau did not
know the residence of the· petitioner. The respondent did not examine· the city records of
Boston. He did not seek information fron1 that
source by letters of inquiry. He did not, so far
as appears, write a letter to the petitioner addressed to Boston or even examine· Boston directories. He did not advertise. for him in Boston
newspapers. He did not solicit knowledge: of hi1n
from the police department of Boston, or ask its
assistance to find him. The diligence of the respondent falls far short of that disclosed by the
administrator in Cleaveland v. Draper, 194 Mass.
118, 80 N.E. 227. The respondent did nort bring
the situation to the attention of the judge. The
respondent occupied a position of trust with respect to the petitioner. That position required the
p:utting forth of every reasonable~ effort to discover him. Instead of making that industrious
and pe.rsevering search, he took the responsibility
of represe~nting to the court in substance and
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effect, by presenting his petition for distribution,
that the petitioner "'"as not in existence at the
time of the death of the intestate and hence not
entitled to share in her estate.''
In the rase of ill orris

Y.

illull,] -t-! N.E. 436.

This is a case where the son of the decedent was
appointed executor of his mother's. will which by the
terms required that a legacy to the sister of the e~xecutor
should be claimed within a two year p·eriod. The executor gave the statutory notices required and on p·etition
for distribution stated: "I do not know the address of
Myra ~lull and have not heard from her for more than
four years past." Distribution was made to the Executor
as the residuary legatee of the bequest which would have
gone to the sister.
The Court said:
"So in the present instance, by naming her
son as executor of the will, the testatrix undoubtedly meant that her executor woruld use thei knowledge that he had of the whereabouts of his siste~r,
growing out of the settle~ment ocf the £ather's
estate, and endeavor in good faith to loc:ate and
notify the plaintiff in error of the terms of her
mother's will.
"It is not conceivable that this mother in.:.
tended that her daughter to whom she gave this'
legacy, should be deprived thereof because she
had no op~portunity to know of the fact of her
mother's death and the running of the two-year
period named in the will, and it is not to be supposed that the mother intended that the son, her
executor, should receive this le·gacy as a reward
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of not having exercised all due diligence to follow
up the information and means of information that
he had relative to the whereabouts of his sister.
"It is not to be lost sight of that this executor, by remaining silent, and simply complying
with the letter of the will and the statute, prevented his sister from learning of the death of her
mother and claiming the legacy under the terms
of the will.
"Has he shown due diligence in the; premises
in the light of the authorities and the record and
undisputed facts in this case~ It cannot be denied
that the conduct of Frank S. Mull, e~ecutor, manifested a purpose on his part to do nothing and
say nothing which might in any way aid the plaintiff in error in discovering her rights under the
will of her mother.
"It is true he claims to have written letters,
which were returned to him; yet unfortunately
they are not produced in evidence. And it is
equally true that within two years he had settled
his father's estate and had personal correspondence with her, as well as correspondence, through
her attorne~y, concerning settlement of that estate.
His own attorney Frank Schnee, under date of
April 3, 1917, sent a check, attached to a receipt
therefor, for her $500 legacy in the estate of the
father of the plaintiff and defendant in error.
And under date of June 18, 1918, the same attorney acting for defendant in error, sent a formal
notice of the claims of F'rank S. Mull, executor
of the estate of Michael Mull, against such estate.
"This state of facts, as evidenced by this
correspondence, the affidavits, etc., is not consistent with the representations made: to the probate
court in the final account filed January, 1920:
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.. ~I do not kno"T the address of ~[~Trul Mull
and have not heard fron1 her for 1uore th·an four
years past.
Frank s. Mull.'
--such representations to the probate court
cannot be reconciled in good conscience with the
duty which a trustee owes his trust. In view of
the personal profit 'Yhich accrued to this defendant in error by reason of his failure to use 'a
greater degree of diligence in the discharge of
his trust, we are of the opinion that his conduct
amounted to a fraud upon his sister, the plaintiff
in error, and that it is not conscionable to p·ermit
such conduct to take refuge behind the fact that
the letter of the will or the statute does not in
terms direct greater activity upon his p~art."
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that the· fraud
which has been shown both upon the plaintiffs and the
court heretofore is sufficient that the Decree of Distribution in the Estate of Charles Carson cannot be any pro...
tection for Loren G. Norton, his bondsmen or E. LeRoy
Shields, executor of the estate of Grace Carson, de·ceased.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs and appellants contend that in this case
on the first point that the judgment is contrary to the
evidence and that Grace Carson could not have been a
widow, claiming to have been married hetwee.n 1923 and
1919 in South Dakota, at which time the decedent Charles
Carson was residing first at Vetal, South Dakota until
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about 1922 and then in Chicago, Illinois until1927. Grace
Carson was hound by her proof of marriage as being
a legal marriage and the evidence disclosed rebuts any
presumption that there was a legal marriage by which
she could have been a widow and heir. Upon that particular theory Grace Carson's entire case would fall as
it clearly would come directly within the holding of the
case of Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Comp·any.
As to the third point involved, plaintiffs and appellants contend first, that there is no argument as shown
by the evidence that both Grace Carson and Loren G.
Norton the administrator, knew of the existence of two
children by conversations prior to the: death of the decedent; secondly, the failure of Grace Carson by her
denials in her petitions and objections filed in the various
causes which were consolidated, to admit at any place
that the·re were any known children and the collaboration
of Grace Carson with Loren G. Norton in which he did
not show good faith with the· court by remaining silent
both before and after his appointment as administrator.
Thirdly, that neither the defendant Loren G. Norton nor
Grace Carson never did give any notice of any kind
during any of the probate proceedings to the plaintiffs;
that Loren G. Norton failed to pubiish a legal notice~ to
creditors and failed to give any notice upon obtaining
two Orders for widow's allowance and failed to give, any
notice, except posting of notices on final distribution of
the estate to E. LeRoy Shields as executor of the Estate
of Grace Carson, deceased. Further, the failure of Loren
G. Norton to inventory $300.00 of assets or inform the
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court at the tin1e of setting of his bond, which monies
had been paid to Grace Carson between the de·ath of
Charles Carson and his appointment on July 22, 1949,
is an extrinsic fraud, and lastly the fact that Loren G.
Norton ""'"ell knew that he and his wife, Gloria Norton,
were the residuary beneficiaries of the Estate of Grace
Carson, deceased, at the date of the filing of the First
and Final Account of the Charles Carson Estate., and
that they would materially gain by not making any disclosures of any known heirs. That Loren G. Norton,
administrator, had the advice of counsel and acted directly contrary to and in the very teeth of the duty imposed
upon him by law and by the bond that provided for
"faithfully executing the duties of the trust according
to law." Further, that Loren G. Norton never did request the instruction of the court at any stage of the
proceedings as to what investigation to make or type
of notice to give when he had knowledge of two purported heirs, which shows the arbitrary manner in which
the guise of the procedure of the court was flaunted with
and particularly to say nothing of the gain that would
be made by the N ortons in not making such disclosures
to the court.
We respectfully contend that Grace Carson, Loren
G. Norton, administrator and E. LeRoy Shields as executor of the Estate of Grace Carson, deceased, have
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not acted in good faith eithe,r to the appeUants and the
plain tiffs or the corurt in the handling of this matter
and have be,en guilty of extrinsic fraud sufficient to
justify the intervention of a court of equity.
Respectfully submitted,

W. D. BEATIE,
Attorney for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.
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